Selected Topics in Business Administration:

Management Myth as a Logical Description of the Management Experience

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1   Introduction

Starting from the general premise that a description signifies experience, moreover another description (thus becomes the signifier of such experience and any other description as signified)[1] this study seeks to demonstrate that a "description" with a particular set of logics is a "myth" with particular outcomes. In this manner I hope to lay ground for making the different views on "myth" converge and therefore depart from (what I seek to demonstrate to be) the central and fundamental function of myth to describe experience in a logical manner. In so doing I also want to offer resistance to contemporary uses of the notion "myth" merely as a fable signifying falsity and irrationality with the hope of giving "myth" to signify the primordial role it has always played: the description of our brief experience and passage in this world.

At the same time I want to render this demonstration (and thereby the resistance) specific. For this reason, at the outset, I want to offer the following definition: "*Management*" refers to the simultaneous and changing process of consumption and production of goods, ideas, language and thought[2]. It follows that the specificity of this study lies in demonstrating that a (management) description with a particular set of logics is a (management) myth with particular outcomes. Thus "management" in its predicative position signifies the specific setting wherein I conduct the general demonstration that a "description" with a particular set of logics is a "myth" with particular outcomes. For reasons of clarity I am led to develop throughout the study a general argumentation (qualified by "general") and a specific argumentation relative to management (qualified by "specific") – the qualifiers "general" and "specific" being exclusively used for this purpose, in addition to placing "management" in a predicative position[3]. It follows that in rendering the demonstration specific, I

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[1] Here and throughout this study, I use the useful distinction made by de Saussure (1959: 67) between 'signifier' and 'signified'.

[2] This is a conceptualization that goes beyond the 'Cameralist' view that management is a rational, efficient and productive activity (Sewell, 2001: 182).

[3] The presence and repetition of the predication "(management)", which is placed before important notions, should not surprise the reader. This is rendered possible by the translation of the general argumentation in the specific context of "management" in an extension or transposition.

attempt to direct the resistance (and critique) against those (non-exhaustive) uses of the notion of "myth" in management as mere deceit and implausibility[4].

Considering that the specific demonstration (and resistance thereof) is a delimited general demonstration, and therefore not different from the latter, I consider two related aspects as the aims of the general demonstration (and by extension, of the specific demonstration). To start with, in discussing the notion of "description", I construct an argument that considers that it is the purpose of a (management) description (why a description does what it does) that informs the way a (management) description is logically organized (how a description does what it does). Therefore, the first aim of this study is to identify and discuss the set of logics (how a description does what it does) that organizes language. I further note that an observed purpose is a realized purpose and thus becomes an outcome of a (management) description (what a description does). Therefore, the second aim of this study is to identify and discuss the outcomes of a (management) description (what a description does) as the realized purposes.

In consequence, this study is an attempt to conceptualize "myth" from the establishment of the outcomes of a (management) description as realized purposes. Further, from the establishment of the set of logics organizing a (management) description relative to the purposes, and therefore outcomes.

This indicates that both the outcomes as realized purposes and the set of logics are the conditions for the existence of "myth" (as a notion). (Management) myth in this way is a particular (management) description, whose particularity stems from the specific and specified conditions for its existence. In specifying these conditions, (management) descriptions that display a particular set of logics become (management) myths with particular outcomes. In this manner "myth" becomes different from "description". It follows that *only* when these conditions have been identified and discussed, can "myth"

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[4] Such (non-exhaustive) uses are found, for instance, in Miller (1995: 21-30) relative to consumption theories. Such uses, however, are not confined to the academic domain. They have, unfortunately, become common - a fact attested by the use, for instance, in 'The Economist' (February 28th, 2004) in its treatment of migration.

be differentiated from "description", generally and particularly in management.

This condition for differentiation points towards the necessity for identifying conditions, which is a heuristic endeavor. It further entails that the differentiation between "myth" and "description" *must* be derived (regardless of whether the demonstration is general or specific). To be precise, it must be derived from having identified the outcomes and logics and *not* from having defined "myth" a priori.

At this point I want to highlight a puzzle. Suppose I did the contrary, that in having conceptualized "description" I chose "myth" as a priori signifier to signify a signified by definition. In this case the difference between them would stem from the fact that they are differently and differentially defined. If this positing takes place, if they are made to be different by definition, there is *no* reason for identifying and discussing the conditions for the existence of "myth" as different from "description". Therefore, the a priori definition of "myth" must be avoided. For this reason, their difference must stem from having identified and discussed the conditions for the existence of "myth" - that is, both the outcomes as realized purposes and the set of logics.

The purpose of identifying and discussing the conditions for the existence of myth is to progressively approach myth and arrive at the conceptualization of those components to be signified by the notion "myth". This means that the same moment when these conditions are identified and discussed, I also identify the components to be signified by the concept "myth". Under these conditions, reference and use of the concept "myth" seems inescapable. At the same time however I need to resist defining "myth" prior to having identified and discussed the conditions. For reasons of clarity again, I have been led to distinguish between a (management) description as (management) myth-to-be (when identifying and discussing the conditions), and a (management) description as (management) myth-as-is (when the conditions have been identified and discussed) signified by "myth", and by extension by (management) myth.

With these preliminary remarks and challenges in mind, the discussion is organized in the following sections. In the first section I discuss "description" and construct the argument that it is the purpose of a (management) description that informs the way such a (management) description is organized. I moreover give a brief

account of the heuristic issues relative to identifying the outcomes (so as to derive the logics thereof). In the second section I present the outcomes as observed and realized purposes. In the third section I discuss the logics. In the fourth and concluding section I conceptualize "myth" (both generally and specifically in relation to management) relative to the identified (and discussed) outcomes and logics in contrast to, and as function of "description", in addition to briefly discussing existing conceptualizations of "myth" and its functions.

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2   (Management) description and selection

"Description", in a general sense, can be considered to be any signifier (that signifies a signified) to speak on behalf of the signified. It is a 'locutionary act' to use Austin (1976: 109) in the sense of describing, 'which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference'. Such a performance implies a function of delegation that is given to the signifier, which in turn implies selection to use Bourdieu (1982: 105-106). It is about the selection of both the signifiers and signifieds.

Before discussing the selection of sets of signifiers and signifieds, I offer to qualify "selection".

To use Cassirer (1953/1946: 24), selection presupposes the establishment of definitions and a set of rules as criteria that enable the conclusion of such an action. It follows that such a positing must exist *prior* to the action of selection since it is a means for carrying out this action. Therefore, I offer the following general definition: "*Selection*" refers to the performance of taking a decision relative to a priori established definitions and rules.

To further use Cassirer (*ibid.*) selection implies an action of differentiation that takes place 'only by means of language, through the very act of naming'. Thus selection is about the performance of taking a decision over which signifier is to signify what signified. At this point, however, the establishment of definitions and rules as criteria for taking such a decision *cannot* be established beforehand. This is because, as the positing of definitions and rules is language-dependent, such a performance presupposes the very thing we are seeking to derive. Put simply, we cannot establish definitions and rules by selecting signifiers to compose such definitions and rules and at the same time consider using definitions and rules to select a signifier, given that there is nothing in a signified to call for a particular signifier.

The solution[5] therefore is to take a decision over naming signifiers *in the absence* of a priori definitions and rules. This is an arbitrary decision. It is moreover a temporary decision over which signifier (tree) is to be related with which signified (tree *qua* tree). Temporary because the relation may be questioned and undone at any time. It is thus immutably fixed so long as its relation is not undermined. At the same time there is the dual recognition that there exist signifieds (tree *qua* tree) to be signified and that there exist signifiers (tree, *arbre*) to be chosen from (and when they do not exist, they need to be constructed). In other words, before selecting signifiers and signifieds we must recognize and acknowledge their existence in addition to a (temporarily) decided relation between them.

The issue now is to understand how from this pool of (arbitrarily) decided signs existing anywhere we (continuously) select some and not others: the dual condition of 'immutability' and 'mutability' in language noted by de Saussure (1959: 71-78). Such an understanding concerns the selected signifiers and signifieds to compose a system[6]. I therefore offer the following general definition: "*Descriptive system*" consists of selected sets of signifiers and signifieds. By extension, (any) (management) descriptive system consists of selected sets of (management) signifiers and (management) signifieds.

This system is not *any* (management) descriptive system. It is that (unique) system which results from the selection of sets of signifiers and signifieds in a sign relation (itself composed by decided signs). I will start with sets of signifiers.

3   Selecting (management) descriptive signatures

If we select sets of signifiers it is for a purpose. The purpose is none other than to signify, to generate meaning to describe the world meaningfully through language, to use Hall (1997a: 25). Put simply, the set of signifiers to compose the (management) descriptive system

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[5] For Cassirer (1953/1946: 25-26) the solution lies in the relationship between 'the logical form of conception' and 'the logical form of judgement' in that a judgement is synthetic therefore leading to the concept and that a concept is used for a judgement.

[6] This also means that we can select (any form of) "description" as a signifier to signify a (management) descriptive system as signified.

is selected relative to the meaning we seek to generate. Thus, I offer the following general definition: "*Descriptive meaning*" as a component of a descriptive system refers to the purpose for which we select sets of signifiers to describe the world. By extension, (management) descriptive meaning as a component of a (management) descriptive system refers to the purpose for which we select sets of (management) signifiers to describe the world (of management).

To elaborate on this point, I want to use the useful distinction made by Hjelmslev (1961: 52) between 'content' and 'form'. In addition, that made by Dretske (1995: 35) between 'content' and 'vehicle', in that 'stories (i.e. story vehicles) are in books, but what happens in the story (content) does not happen in a book'. It follows from both distinctions that form is the vehicle of a content and that the latter is outside form. With these tools at hand, I offer the following proposition (p1): *It is the (management) descriptive meaning as content that begs for a form as vehicle for this content (what is meant decides what means).*

It is *not* the other way round[7]. If it were that form as the vehicle for a content begs for a (management) descriptive meaning as this content, this would simply mean that what means decides what is meant, that we select signifiers blindly without knowing what they refer to since meaning would be produced a posteriori.

It follows that in this one-to-one relation between content and form, the latter is chosen and to reveal only *this* content. In the absence of *this* purpose there is no reason for selection[8].

To further use a distinction made by Dretske (1995: 23), itself drawn on Frege (in Gunther, 2003: 6-7), between reference (the element whose properties descriptions signify), and sense (the properties descriptions have the function of signifying), I want to define, in general, two forms of descriptive meaning. "*Elemental descriptive meaning*" refers to that resulting from signifying (and

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[7] Instead of asking 'what does "tree" signify?' one should be asking 'what is signified by "tree"?' - although this active-passive conversion is unproblematic from a grammatical viewpoint, in practice the time sequence in the cause-effect direction is different.

[8] We can certainly put signifiers together, but in the absence of decided signification meaning cannot exist. This means that decided signification must be shared, commonly referred to and used without prior agreement.

marking) the elements that compose our surrounding(s) inclusive of our self, in addition to those events (and actions) that concern such elements. By extension, (management) elemental descriptive refers to that resulting from signifying (and marking) the (management) elements that compose our (management) environment and the (management) events therein. "*Proprietary descriptive meaning*" refers to that resulting from signifying (and marking) the properties of signified elements and events. By extension again, (management) proprietary (management) descriptive meaning refers to that resulting from signifying (and marking) the properties of (management) elements and events.

Thus, signified elements (chair / organization) and events (love / decide), whose properties are respectively qualified adjectivally (brown / robust), and adverbially (madly / swiftly), are captured in language by a set of signifiers and qualifiers (brown chair / robust organization; love madly / decide swiftly).

The choice of signifiers (and qualifiers) to compose the (management) descriptive system gives the system its particularity[9]. For this I offer the following general definition: "*Descriptive signature*" as a component of a descriptive system refers to the chosen set of signifiers and qualifiers for the purpose of generating descriptive meaning. By extension, (management) descriptive signature as a component of a (management) descriptive system refers to the chosen set of (management) signifiers and qualifiers for the purpose of generating (management) descriptive meaning.

And given proposition p1 (that content begs for a form as vehicle for this content), we select a (management) descriptive signature and therefore the set of signifiers and qualifiers to compose the (management) descriptive system relative to the (management) descriptive meaning we seek to generate.

For Derrida (1982/1972: 328-329) a signature has a 'repeatable, iterable, imitable form; [it is] able to detach itself from the present and singular intention of its production. It is sameness that, in altering its identity and singularity, divides the seal'. A descriptive signature is thus a repetition that gives a given (management) descriptive system

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[9] It seems to me that the cluster adjective-noun is more important than the set adverb-verb as the former carries a value (captured in the signifying cluster properties-element), that which we consider important, and at times worth fighting for.

its uniqueness and therefore its difference from another system. To use Deleuze (1994/1968: 76) a descriptive signature as difference 'inhabits' repetition as it 'lies between two repetitions', between two repeated descriptive signatures. Such a difference and repetition characterizing any descriptive signature derive from the fact of selection relative to that which we want to mean, and they are premised on the intention to mean, thus on the use of the (management) descriptive signature (to mean).

It is worth noting that in general we can observe a one-to-one relationship between the (management) descriptive meaning and signature. It is equally possible to mean one thing and say another, but this does not imply absence of intention. The relationship is no less coherent since the way the (management) descriptive system is organized relative to its (management) descriptive signature is dependent on the purpose of the (management) descriptive system. In other words, the uniqueness of a (management) descriptive system arises from the selection of a (management) descriptive signature to signify a (management) descriptive meaning that is premised on use.

4   Selecting (management) descriptive meanings

The discussion thus far enables me to propose the following construct (c1): *The function of a (management) descriptive system is to generate (management) descriptive meaning (as content) from having selected a (management) descriptive signature (as form and vehicle) relative to a (management) descriptive meaning*.

This construct highlights the selection of a (management) descriptive signature but does not say anything about the selection of a (management) descriptive meaning. I therefore still need to examine the way and the reason a (management) descriptive meaning is selected.

If a (management) descriptive meaning is selected, as far as the way is concerned, we must have a prior definition and a set of rules to be used as criteria of selection. As far as the reason is concerned, there must be a purpose (other than the (management) descriptive meaning as the purpose for selecting a (management) descriptive signature). In using again proposition p1 (that content begs for a form as vehicle for this content), this purpose (other than the (management) descriptive meaning as the purpose for selecting a (management) descriptive

signature) must beg for a form as vehicle for this content. Purpose is outside form as vehicle. The issue at this point is to understand what purpose and form (as vehicle) are being referred to.

Relative to the former, in using a distinction made by Hall (1997a: 36-42, 43-47) between 'content' and 'effect'[10], I offer the following proposition (p2): *The sought after effect begs for (management) descriptive meaning (what is to occur decides what is meant)*[11].

Such a purpose is for Bourdieu (1982: 106) related to using language. With Austin (1976: 109, original emphasis) it is about performing a 'perlocutionary act' in terms of 'what we bring about or achieve *by* saying something'. It is therefore an intention[12] in that we do *not* mean for the sake of meaning alone. We mean for a reason. We mean for an action, a performance. We mean with the expectation that an event will take place relative to the meaning chosen. This is why a form as vehicle does what it does, regardless of the type of vehicle[13]. If this is the case, the consequences are twofold.

First, if purpose is the reason why a form as vehicle does what it does, (management) descriptive meaning becomes silent. This does not imply its absence. There is only a discernible relation between the effect sought after and the (management) descriptive signature. Such a relation can be captured in combining propositions p1 (that content begs for a form as vehicle for this content) and p2 (that what is to occur decides what is meant). I therefore offer the following proposition (p3): *The sought after effect begs for a form as vehicle for a content (what is to occur decides what means)*.

Second, if the purpose for selecting (management) descriptive meanings is none other than the sought after effect, this means that

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[10] These are, respectively, conceptualized through both the 'semiotic' and 'discursive' approaches'. This is a distinction that rests on that between 'structuralism' and 'post-structuralism' (Best & Kellner, 1991: 18-21). But as Best and Kellner (1991: 26) have argued such a distinction is unnecessary because 'discourse theory can be read as a variant of semiotics which develops the earlier project of analyzing society in terms of systems of signs and sign systems'. This unification of approaches I have attempted to do here.

[11] It is not the other way round for the same reason offered for proposition p1.

[12] It is another matter whether this is achieved or not.

[13] In this respect Austin (1976: 119) claims that a feature of perlocutionary act in the achievement of perlocutionary objects and sequels, that is, effects, by non-locutionary means.

purpose precedes selection. An additional result is that if effect is to determine form, the effect as content precedes form. The effect as content is chosen first as purpose. It bears a future reference. Thus, in amending proposition p1 (that content begs for a form as vehicle for this content), I offer the following proposition (p4): *It is the (management) descriptive meaning as content that is to beg for a form as vehicle for this content (what is to be meant decides what means)*[14].

Given that the above propositions link a future-oriented purpose with a present choice of signifiers and qualifiers, for heuristic purposes it is instructive to effect a temporal link relative to effect at this point. Namely, between the sought after effect as being the purpose to be achieved in the future and the purpose that has been achieved in the present. The former line of thought uses the idea that 'act' is '*the reason* for the movement into the future' to use Stacey et al (2000: 14, original emphasis). Act is the overarching source of becoming, as it is the tendency towards some *supreme goal* ($\tau\varepsilon\lambda o\varsigma$) (that qualifies all prior actions). This is the essence of proposition 2. The later line of thought uses the temporal positioning of 'act' offered by Schutz (1967/1932: 39-40) in that it refers to meaning-contents that are already constituted. Act consists in the terminated and completed action as a highlighted and qualified present moment (in a series of actions). Thus, the purpose achieved in the present is a realized purpose. It is an effect that can be observed. In this way I offer to amend proposition p2 (what is to occur decides what is meant) as follows (p5): *The observed sought after effect begs for (management) descriptive meaning (what occurs decides what is meant)*[15].

To sum, we select (management) descriptive meanings relative to the sought after effect, and the sought after effect informs the selection of (management) descriptive meanings. Their difference simply lies in what is observable or not. Only realized purposes are (whereas idealized purposes are expected to be realized, only that we

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[14] It is not the other way round for the same reason offered for proposition p1.

[15] Although propositions 2 and 5 are different relative to whether purpose as effect is idealized or realized, they display a common denominator, the (management) descriptive signature. This common factor enables the temporal link relative to purpose.

do not when and if such a realization does occur). Simply put, realized purposes are the outcomes of a (management) description[16].

If this is the case, the construct c1 that I previously proposed can be augmented to include the above insights (c2): *A (management) descriptive system (whose function is to generate (management) descriptive meaning from having selected and used a (management) descriptive signature relative to a (management) descriptive meaning) needs to acquire a set logics that enable the relation (between (management) descriptive meaning and effect) wherein the (management) descriptive signature is lodged (relative to purpose).*

I now need to establish such outcomes (what a description does) as realized purpose (why a description does what it does) that informs an organization (how a description does what it does), that is, the logics (with the purpose of conceptualizing such descriptions as "myth").

5   Heuristics

To establish the outcomes of (management) descriptions, I examine different (non-exhaustive) management descriptions. To accomplish this[17], I briefly locate such (management) descriptions relative to experience (as their content) so as to justify the use of a particular type of (management) description for my present heuristic purposes. I further give a brief account of the principles underlying the approach for deducing the outcomes from the chosen management (management) descriptions. It is about observing what these (management) descriptions (intend to) do.

To locate descriptions relative to experience I propose to distinguish and define in general two forms of describing relative to experience. "*Presentation*" refers to the (first-hand) description of experience by means of a descriptive signature to signify any aspect of

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[16] This is what enables a heuristic endeavor into identifying the outcomes and logics. If purpose where not realized but only idealized, it would not be observable, and therefore we would not be able to establish what a (management) description does.

[17] The purpose here is not to give a detailed exposition of this heuristic endeavor as it is too wide a concern to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner. Rather, I intend to give a brief account of the basic issues and challenges that have lead me to the establishment of these outcomes.

this (presentational) experience[18]. By extension a (management) presentation" refers to the (first-hand) (management) description of (management) experience by means of a (management) descriptive signature to signify any aspect of this (presentational) experience. "*Re-presentation*" refers to the (second-hand) description of an experienced presentation by means of a descriptive signature to signify any aspect of this (re-presentational) experience[19]. Again, by extension, (management) re-presentation refers to the (second-hand) (management) description of an experienced presentation by means of a (management) descriptive signature to signify any aspect of this (re-presentational) experience. In this way re-presentation is simply about presenting again. It is a repetition to use Deleuze (1994/1968: 56) since the 'prefix RE- in the word representation signifies this conceptual form of the identical which subordinates differences'.

Simply and specifically put, capturing (management) experience is about understanding management as a lived experience on a day to day basis involving its (first-hand) description, its presentation as a (first-hand) (management) description. An understanding of such presentations involves experiencing and making sense of such (first-hand) (management) descriptions. Thus, giving an account of such presentations involves their re-presentation, their (second-hand) (management) description.

The reason for choosing (management) re-presentations lies in the functional difference between re-presentation and presentation in terms of two aspects of experience that I define in general as follows. "*Experiential presence*" refers to the presence of a common denominator in the various forms of description. By extension, (management) experiential presence refers to the presence of a common denominator in the various forms of (management)

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[18] Presentation should not be understood in the sense of experience making present a non-conceptual content in our mind though our sensual apparatus, an approach used by Metzinger (2003: 86-87) that highlights the function of possessing and using information without possessing a concept.

[19] Representation should not be understood as the process of 'using language to say something meaningful … to other people' according to Hall (1997a: 15-17) with the idea that because experiences cannot be presented directly to the other, they must instead be represented through language to use Grayson (1998: 27).

description. "*Experiential visibility*" refers to the minimal distance[20] between experience and the various forms of (management) description[21]. Again, by extension, (management) experiential visibility refers to the minimal distance between experience and the various forms of (management) description.

Let me explain. It is clear that both (management) presentation and re-presentation in the manner they have been conceptualized serve the function of capturing (management) experience. They both aim at speaking on behalf of a concern. Their respective vehicles perform the same function, and thus (management) presentations and re-presentations are structured in the same manner. They have the same form. There is nonetheless a fundamental difference between them in terms of the content.

The content of a (management) presentation is (management) experience itself. It concerns a single experience. Presentations of (management) experience are a (sifted) (management) description that tends to conjecture on experience in the attempt to highlight the elements that make up experience. It is a single (management) description that signifies and qualifies individual experience. The content of a re-presentation is the experienced presentation whose content is experience itself. It concerns a dual experience. Re-presentations of presentations are a (sifted) (management) description that tends to conjecture on presentations in the attempt to highlight the elements that make up a set of presentations. It is a dual (management) description that signifies and qualifies a number of (collectively presented) experiences, and at the same time, signifies and qualifies individual experience (relative to such collectively presented experiences). Therefore, experiential presence in re-presentation stems from the presence of a common denominator of experience found across individual presentations themselves lacking such presence. This is because, I cannot know of such a common denominator as I do not know whether the signifiers and qualifiers of my experience can apply to you or the other. Now let me explore the issue of experiential visibility.

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[20] The notion of minimal distance is derived from Ricoeur (1975: 181) in his discussion of neutral language.

[21] Here experience and its (management) description are considered to be repetitions with Deleuze (1994/1968: 84).

When I present experience I am concerned with describing only what I have lived. In a certain sense, when I present my experience, I come close to my experience[22]. Thus, the visibility of my experience is high. When I re-present experience I am concerned with describing what others have lived *through* their presentations (as factual enactment), what others have lived *in* their presentations (as affectual enactment) and what I have lived through and in such presentations since I have experienced them (in affect and effect). In a certain sense, whether general or specific, when I re-present the experience of the other I present my experience of a (management) description while I re-present the experience that the other has presented. Although in the first case I come close to my experience, with the latter I *cannot* consider that I come close to the experience of the other. In fact, I do not and cannot know it. Therefore, the visibility of my experience (relative to the presentations) is high, whereas the visibility of my experience (relative to the experience of the other that is presented) must be low since the experience of the other is located further afield.

With these insights in mind, I offer the following proposition (p6): *(Management) presentation displays (management) experiential visibility but not (management) experiential presence since such a denominator cannot be established; conversely, (management) re-presentation displays (management) experiential presence but not (management) experiential visibility*.

Simply put, the difference between (management) presentation and re-presentation lies in the fact that with the latter such a common denominator has already been established (as realized purpose), whereas with the former such denominator is yet to be established (as idealized purpose). It is simply a question of presence in that with the former the common denominator is already there.

I do *not* imply from this that we cannot derive a common denominator from (management) presentations. This is because there are no a priori premises from where I am prevented from finding experiential presence in (management) presentations. On the contrary, we can. This endeavor is however conditional, because experiential presence is conditional. I can find a common denominator *on condition* that a number of such presentations are gathered and

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[22] If I come close to my experience I approximate it and do not imply that experience and its description correspond.

compared for identifying a common denominator, in the typical sense of re-search. If this condition is satisfied, the resulting (management) description of such a common denominator constitutes a re-presentation by definition. It follows that if this condition is satisfied experiential presence can be derived with both presentations and re-presentations.

Deriving experiential presence and therefore identifying realized purposes can only occur when I am placed outside presented and re-presented experiences to understand them, to find common patterns, and thereafter describe them relative to how I have experienced such (management) descriptions.

My position relative to such (management) descriptions is however different in terms of whether it is a presentation of a re-presentation. When I describe experienced (management) presentations in a re-presentation I am positioned outside a presentation, but not of my re-presentation. In this case I am positioned outside a presentation *but not* a re-presentation: I cannot identify realized outcomes. For this to be the case I need to position myself outside my re-presentation. This is impossible unless I construct a re-re-presentation to describe experienced re-presentations relative to my re-presentation and that of others. In other words, when I describe experienced (management) re-presentations in a re-presentation[23] I am positioned outside a re-presentation as experienced presentation, but not of my *re*-re-presentation. In this case I am positioned outside a (management) presentation *and* a re-presentation: I *can* identify realized outcomes.

It must be clear from this line of thought that (management) re-presentations display a positional advantage over presentations since the latter require three repetitions so as to derive the realized outcomes as a common denominator. However, considering proposition p6 we lose in (management) experiential visibility when dealing with (management) re-presentations. For this reason and as an attempt to strike a balance between experiential presence and visibility while giving priority to re-presentations, my approach here is to first derive

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[23] In so doing, presentations can receive a label, they can be named, because there is nothing in a presentation to be a priori classified as a particular (management) description that is similar or different from other (management) descriptions. This occurs a posteriori, thus only when theorized and re-presented (as such and not otherwise).

the outcomes from (management) re-presentations and then confirm the existence of such outcomes from (management) presentations by making them specific.

To further develop this point, I deal with three heuristic aspects. First, I experience management re-presented experiences and then describe them as a result of this experience in key concerns[24]. Second, I observe what management re-presented experiences do to me (and not to you or the other since this I cannot know) and then describe such an effect as the sought after effects as outcomes, as the common denominator underpinning such re-presentations. And last, I prepare a investigative tool that takes into account the identified key concerns so as to validate the existence of identified (general) outcomes empirically by rendering these specific, and then describe such an endeavor. Now, let me give some additional indications as to how these heuristic aims are to be achieved.

Relative to the first aim, my concern with experiencing and describing re-presenting management re-presented experiences into key concerns involves analyzing and synthesizing the way such re-presentations are constructed. This is akin to 'discourse analysis' (Potter & Wetherell, 2001/1987: 198-199, original emphasis) whose starting point is that we use language 'to *construct* versions of the social world'. The existence of such versions is premised on the existence of a foundation, the (management) descriptive signature, and therefore selection and (management) description into unifying themes, whose aim is to translate the link between "management" as an event and its specific descriptions as re-presentations. Such versions are therefore key concerns that are signified by the (management) descriptive signature. To therefore achieve my first aim, I seek to uncover such (management) descriptive signatures by identifying signifiers and qualifiers of management re-presented experiences. Then I mark out their similarities in key concerns, which I render in a (management) description.

Relative to the second aim, my concern with observing and describing what management re-presented experiences do to me involves analyzing and synthesizing the effects of the way such re-presentations are constructed. This is akin to what Rodriguez and

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[24] Since my concern here are the outcomes, I have chosen not to devote much space for describing such an experience.

Ryave (2002: 1-2) have labeled as 'systematic self-observation' as an 'an ordinary feature of everyday experience'. It involves observing and recording a 'selected feature of [my] own experience' *(ibid.)* relative to and as a function of management re-presented experiences with the purpose of producing accurate descriptions of this experience. It is about describing 'the actions and words spoken, along with any background information, thoughts, and emotions that encompass [a] phenomenon' to establish 'the order and organization that shapes natural life experiences and activities' to use Rodriguez and Ryave (2002: 2, 11). Thus, to achieve my second aim, I record my thoughts and feelings arising from what and how I experience management re-presented experiences. I then make sense of such disorderly material in a narrative. It is this narrative that I present here. It is a description that reveals the order, resulting from my experience as the outcome of this inquiry, as the very outcomes to be identified.

Finally, relative to the third aim, my concern with validating and describing the existence of outcomes involves using the results from the previous two methods to establish that the identified outcomes are *in fact* the sought after effects. This is premised on proposition p2 (what is to occur decides what is meant) and proposition p5 (what occurs decides what is meant). Or generally put, that we describe for a purpose, and if this is the case, it is for a specific (realized) purpose, the sought after effects as outcomes that I seek to render specific. At the same time, if different key concerns are signified by different (management) descriptive signatures, it means that a different (management) descriptive system is selected each time there is a different (management) descriptive signature. To therefore validate the existence of outcomes, I must find a common denominator characterizing all (management) descriptive systems and therefore underpinning management re-presented experiences. Approaching validation in this manner is akin to observing the outcomes from a "meta" position and using a 'deductive' method for Gill and Johnson (1997: 28) as it involves the progression of the general to the particular according to Hjelmslev (1961: 12-13)[25]. It is about the a posteriori construction of knowledge to use Kant (1998/1781 & 1787:

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[25] Copi and Burgess-Jackson (1992: 59-61) propose as the criterion the degree of closeness between the premise and the conclusion, in that under deduction the relationship is strict in that if an argument is valid and its premises true, the conclusion must be true.

255), verification itself. Thus, to achieve my third aim, I first seek confirmation that whenever we describe the way we practise management to others it is for a purpose. Then I seek to establish the specific set of (realized) purposes as the sought after effects as outcomes. For this, I translate two sets of findings, a process that involves their 'operationalisation' (Gill & Johnson, 1997: 29). On the one hand, the identified key concerns into clusters. On the other hand, the identified general outcomes into specific statements as proposed outcomes to be found in the delineated clusters. The resulting clustered propositions are set in questionnaire form, so as to give management practitioners the opportunity to 'interpret' what is written (Kumar, 1999: 110). That is, to identify the extent to which there is agreement between the offered propositions (that I have identified and specified as outcomes) and that what the management practitioners actually do in their daily management actions.

I now turn to describing the findings of such a heuristic endeavor relative to the three aims.

II

6 Experienced re-presentations

I have argued that the establishment of outcomes (what a description does) as realized purpose (why a description does what it does) gives us clues as per a logical organization (how a description does what it does). Only in light of such findings shall I be able to offer a conceptualization of "myth" as the "description" that displays a set of logics for a particular effect. Thus the main concern here is to give an account of such effects as outcomes.

In order to achieve this, I have to deal with my first heuristic task, to examine management re-presented experiences[26] so as to uncover their management descriptive signature.

The outcomes of such an examination I now present in a classification of unifying themes[27]. This classification is based on the idea that (management) re-presentations describe a concern, management, as a process, hence as an action that is signified and qualified by a (management) descriptive signature relative to a (management) descriptive meaning, a content that stems from a particular concern during that action.

To start with, management re-presented experiences have a rational content carried by a rational signature[28]. Management is

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[26] The reader could be interested to know that the (non-exhaustive) management re-presentations I have used include the following aspects. To start with, I have used strategy and strategic management accounts with Elfring & Volberda (2001: 3-8), and Whittington (1993: 10-41). Second, leadership theories and approaches with Northouse (1997: 13-157), and Yukl (1998: 149-171, 265-347). Third, complexity issues in management with Stacey et al. (2000: 12-55). Fourth, management paradigms and schools of thought with Burns & Stalker (1994/1961: 332-333), Collins (1998: 9-81), Donaldson (1995: 15-27), Fenton & Pettigrew (2000: 9-34), and Salaman (1997: 241-252). Finally, I have used various sources regarding the issues of power and (modeled) organizational structures notably Bush (1997: 68-69, 72-74), Fidler (1997: 55-57), Hargreaves (1997: 240-244), Meyerson & Martin (1997: 32, 34, 37), and Morgan (1993: 213).

[27] The present discussion is indicative only as a way to introduce the discussion of outcomes, which is my main concern here. It is therefore not an exhaustive and extensive treatment of management re-presentations.

[28] To use Stacey et al (2000: 52), 'secular natural law teleology' and 'rationalist teleology' characterize rational content.

concerned with the efficient performance of the organization in its whole and its parts to achieve organizational purposes. For this reason organizations need to consider management as a controlled process of thought whose implementation can occur only after the planning phase has been completed. The use of rational analyses enable organizations to put in place structures that clarify responsibilities, and to enable staff, as rational economic agents, to complete work in terms of its extrinsic rewards. In this manner organizational activities are grouped in the same administrative unit, under a single authority whose power stems from personality[29] and the position held. Overall, management is concerned with ensuring that everything occurs in conformity with policy and practice.

Management re-presented experiences further have a turbulent content carried by a turbulent signature[30]. Management is moved by the efficient performance of the organization in an environment that is contingent and characterized by dynamic and changing activities. For Rosenau (1990: 59-60) these activities make up after Emery and Trist the turbulent environment, one in which the degrees of complexity and dynamism are high. To understand the forces that affect organizations, the environment is partitioned so as to minimize its effects and adopting practices to suit the situation, which require from managers to have both a directive and supportive dimension[31]. These practices are aimed at the survival of organizations as they give rise to the most appropriate acts of differentiation and a concern for plurality in the search of options relative to external and internal pressures in the attempt to achieve planned goals. This means that only certain management styles are effective in certain situations, and hence the adoption of ad hoc policies when confronted with a larger and often hostile environment that is complex, and uncertain. Overall, management is concerned with aligning and re-aligning the organization with the environment through networks arising from an interdependence of loosely coupled individual lines of action.

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[29] Northouse (1997: 17-18) highlights the 'trait approach'.

[30] To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the turbulent content is characterized by a 'formative rationality', and an 'adaptionist teleology'.

[31] In particular Northouse (1997: 54-56) highlights the 'situational approach'.

Management re-presented experiences exhibit a cultural content carried by a cultural signature[32]. Management is concerned with the values and moral content of social and cultural practices relative to projected or attained acts within a social framework and its particular way of doing. The central role of management is to establish a particular way of understanding, structuring, conducting and talking about business life that is unique to an organization. Management is about affecting the development of the 'right culture' leading to a more effective organization which is the 'condition for success' (Peters & Waterman, 1983: 93). Management is concerned with deriving the norms guiding action from the cultural rules of the local society, which serves the purpose of normalizing the structures of a particular culture. The ensuing organizational culture provides staff with a sense of common direction and guidelines for behavior according to Deal and Kennedy (1997/1991: 273). Management then is about fostering co-operation and commitment through motivation, which means giving employees the autonomy to own the responsibility of their actions[33]. Such transformational practices are concerned with shaping the culture of the group, a 'culture of teamwork' for Wallace and Hall (1997: 88-89) where values and beliefs relating to norms are shared. This implies the application of knowledge by way of mechanisms, devices and regulatory interventions, including communication of priorities, reactions to crises, role modeling, allocation of rewards, and staff selection for Yukl (1998: 330-331). Overall, management is concerned with the construction of a single discourse, a view staff can recognize, to internalize the objectives and values of the organization.

Management re-presented experiences display an emotional content carried by an emotional signature[34]. Management focuses on human relations based on the premise that staff are emotional, which means that management action is influenced by the emotions that its members have relative to acts. There is a concern with the emotional content of staff, their personal values, and not only their rational or cultural content. This entails providing staff with opportunities that enable the expression of individual values, rather than those shared,

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[32] To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the culture content is characterized by a 'transformative teleology'.

[33] With House and Mitchell (in Northouse, 1997: 89) managers need to adopt a 'path-goal approach'.

[34] To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the emotional content is characterized by an 'adaptive teleology'.

because they are 'relativistic' for Holbrook (1999:6-7), in that they depend on individual preferences and changing situations. There is therefore a separate exchange relationship with each individual member of staff in the organization as the two parties mutually define their role – a dyadic role[35]. Management is about ensuring that members of staff feel they are part of the in-group. It is achieved when equity and corrective feedback are emphasized to create a social unit wherein management seeks to promote and cultivate group norms in order to tap the potential for increasing output[36]. For Sparrow (1998: 12-13) this is about managing by perception. Overall, management is concerned with the development of mutual understanding and learning where common values arise from socialization, democratic principles, and consensual decision-making.

     Management re-presented experiences have a power content carried by a power signature[37]. With Pfeffer (1993: 201-204) management is influenced by power stemming neither from structure, nor from culture, but rather from the very rationality of management action that is informed by the very acts that management wishes to achieve. Management is about the recognition of the varying interests in any organization, inclusive of the various points of view relative to the concerns under question. At the same time, the achievement of intended acts through the acquisition and use of sources of power, each qualified by its own strategies and tactics. There is a focus on balancing and coordinating the interests of organizational members to work within the constraints set by organizational acts reflecting the interests of stakeholders. This also means that management is a sticky and messy phenomenon, to use Whittington (1993: 22), from where short-term and short-lived acts emerge. Management then tends to evolve in leaps and hence is based on adaptive rationality, the gradual adjusting to environmental turbulence. Overall, management is concerned with locating both temporally and contextually individuals as nodes who are connected by shared concerns at a given moment,

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[35] A 'leader-member exchange approach' (Northouse, 1997: 109; Yukl, 1998: 150).

[36] Team management in the model of managerial behavior proposed by Blake and Mouton (in Northouse, 1977: 38-39), under the 'style approach'.

[37] To use Stacey et al (2000: 52) the power content is characterized by an 'adaptionist teleology'.

leading to an uncontrollable dynamic where conflict is seen as a means to arrive at individual or organizational goals[38].

Finally, management re-presented experiences display a discursive content carried by a discursive signature[39]. Management is moved by the use of power to convince, to persuade. To use Jones (1998: 417-418), management action is not determined by the act itself but rather the way both action and acts are convincingly formulated. Management is about constructing a discourse to provide a link between (management) description and practice and those involved by it. This implies the rationalization of successes and failures to sustain and enhance the right to manage by demonstrating such managerial rationality. Further, providing a number of assumptions underpinning management practice in that everything is explicable, and creating a language and practice which enables the construction of an identity. In this way organizational problems are defined and solutions offered, especially when a change in organizational systems is required to meet new challenges. Overall, management is concerned with transforming mentalities and ordinary goals into challenges, in the attempt to raise needs to higher levels of motivation and maturity while striving to fulfil a potential.

7   (General) outcomes in brief

Having briefly presented the (classified) contents carried by (classified) (management) descriptive signatures of management re-presented experiences under examination, I am now concerned with the second heuristic aim, to observe what management re-presented experiences do to me.

Here I discuss the outcome of such an examination. I discuss in other words the outcomes of (management) descriptions in terms of what such (management) descriptions do as realized purposes, what the effects of such (management) descriptions are. The underlying

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[38] It is the latter that has led Morgan (1993: 215) to note that conflict and power can serve both positive and negative functions.

[39] The view I am here advocating is not to be confused with the discursive approach, in its radical version, which is often used as a critique aiming at exposing the inherent contradictions residing in management discourses. Here I am concerned with discourse as a means to facilitate management as a process. Note also that this approach is used for the empirical validation of the existence of outcomes.

(and unifying) general idea is that we select (non-discernible) descriptive meanings and therefore descriptive signatures to form a descriptive system relative to the sought after effects (as the first component of descriptions as myth-to-be) as the common denominator characterizing descriptive systems (and therefore management re-presented experiences).

Briefly, such an examination reveals a clear and perceptible tendency to order and classify experience so as to construct identifiable entities.

These two main findings[40] point towards the idea that we select (management) descriptive meanings and therefore (management) descriptive signatures to form a unique (management) description as (management) myth-to-be for the purpose of being authoritative, credible, and constant.

These three purposes, in turn, constitute the power base of the (management) descriptive system for the non-discernible purpose of easing the recruitment of members who in believing in the (management) descriptive system are governed and directed by it. This is a situation of a total (management) description of experience, in that a unique (management) description as (management) myth-to-be dominates.

Let me now present these (general) outcomes in some detail, and I start with those that are discernible.

8 Constructing classifications

To select (management) descriptive meanings and therefore (management) descriptive signatures for the purpose of being influential, trustworthy, and consistent, for the purpose of easing the recruitment of members, two issues emerge relative to classifying experience. First, the issue of vesting authority to order and classify experience. And second the issue of establishing parameters to order and classify experience.

Relative to the first issue, it appears that although language manifests and symbolizes the authority to speak on behalf of experience, it does not derive such an authority and power from the

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[40] This is certainly a non-exhaustive list of findings. They nevertheless constitute the basis on which the remainder of (equally non-exhaustive) outcomes is based.

context of management. Rather, it stems from the position of the delegate, the presenter or management re-presented experiences, in terms of the access to legitimate instruments of expression. This seems to be confirmed by Bourdieu (1982: 105-107) who argues[41] that language is not only just to describe experience but also to act relative to this experience from the fact that it is not uttered for personal reasons. Thus to use Bourdieu it is the institutionalized instruments of expression that provide authority for signifying (management) experience and therefore ordering and classifying it (since classifying implies selecting).

In this manner the institutionalized instruments of expression are located outside the self. If this is the case, access to such instruments and therefore authority is conditioned on the ability to find the means for such accessibility. If this condition is *not* satisfied, the self seems *not* to possess the ability to signify, order and classify experience. Thus the presenter of management re-presented experiences loses the ability to order and classify experience. Although we cannot deny the existence of an institutionalized other by the (observed) fact that we set foot in society and come in language and modes of expression that are there, we cannot wholly dismiss our capacity to question such order or even threaten it. This is because in the process of language acquisition we also learn how to value such language and therefore the other. If this is the case, the authority for signifying, ordering and classifying experience is vested in both the self and the (institutionalized) other.

Under such state of affairs, to use Bourdieu (1982: 136), we can expect a 'struggle over classification' (*lutte des classements*) between self and (institutionalized) other (inclusive of the struggles between institutionalized others). This is none other than the conflict over definitions, and thus over the elemental and proprietary (management) descriptive meanings. It is an antagonism that is directed at 'determining the mental representation that others may create of such properties and of their carriers' *(ibid.)*. Simply put, if the authority for

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[41] Bourdieu (1982: 105-107) argues against claims that the power of language resides in the very function it is expected to perform because authority has not been given from outside. His critique seems to be directed against the claim made by Habermas (in Outhwaite, 1996: 127) that 'speech acts owe their illocutionary force to a cluster of validity-claims … inherent in the structure of speech' in the 'performance of an act *in* saying something' (Austin, 1976: 99-100, original emphasis).

classifying experience is vested in both the self and the (institutionalized) other, it follows that we are all concerned by this antagonism by being involved in it, whether this be you, the (institutionalized) other, or myself. And this is visible by the plurality of standpoints[42].

This takes us to the second issue. What is at stake in this struggle, is the establishment of a discontinuity in what could be expected to be continuity (in the absence of partitioning criteria). It is about imposing a definition of partitions that is to be considered legitimate, inclusive of the recognition of the resulting (localized) partitions. It is not a question of who is to establish such a discontinuity bur rather a question that concerns the manner and therefore the definitions and rules to have at hand so as to establish such discontinuities and partitions. Put simply, the criteria that presenters of management re-presented experiences use.

The criteria to have at hand that seem to emerge are related to two modes of taking decisions, which I generally define as follows[43]. "*Decision with criterion*" refers to selecting in the presence of a justification in that the justification acts on behalf of such a decision. By extension, (management) decision with criterion refers to selecting in the presence of a justification in that the justification acts on behalf of such a (management) decision. "*Decision without criterion*" refers to selecting in the absence of a justification. And again, by extension, (management) decision without criterion refers to selecting in the absence of a justification.

Thus, in setting discontinuities to separate the similar from the dissimilar, the purpose of classifying is to delineate the common properties of elements being referred to. We are signifying (and marking) the properties of signified elements and events based on the premise that such elements (might) display a common denominator. We can decide over such signifiers and qualifiers thus on the (management) descriptive signature either a priori or posteriori. In the former case we first take a decision over the (management) descriptive

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[42] As an illustration of this point, Donaldson (1995: 1) observes 'an outbreak of irrationality' in the sense of a fragmentation and a 'lack of cumulation in research'.

[43] Note that this approach avoids the situation where we seek to establish discontinuities and partitions by selecting signifiers to signify such discontinuities and regions and at the same time consider using discontinuities and regions to select such signifiers.

signature to signify such a common denominator. It is a (management) decision without criterion thus without justification for such a choice because the signified is absent or merely not yet identified. In the latter, we first seek to establish the common denominator and then take the decision over the (management) descriptive signature to signify such a common denominator. It is a (management) decision with criterion with a justification for such choice stemming from having identified, or rather contemplated such a signified[44]. Yet the choice of a signifier is arbitrary unless already there. In this case we are merely re-presenting what has already been presented.

With either manner a "class" signifies the (management) descriptive signature to signify such a common denominator. Since the establishment of such a common denominator is the reason for deciding over such a (management) descriptive signature, the common denominator as purpose *is* the (management) descriptive meaning of the (management) descriptive system under construction to be signified by a (management) descriptive signature. This set of signifiers and qualifiers is the backbone of the classification as it informs divisions. These signified divisions are to include elements and their properties, thus (management) elemental and proprietary descriptive meanings found in other (management) descriptive systems[45]. It follows that a (management) descriptive signature whose function is to classify signifies the equation of two or more (management) descriptive meanings originally signified by different (management) descriptive signatures[46].

Overall then two (general) outcomes emerge: Both self and the (institutionalized) other by virtue of the authority that is vested in them are involved with struggles over setting partitions. Such partitions are set by decisions taken either with or without criteria to

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[44] As an illustration of this point, Collins (1998: 9-10) seems to be taking this direction when starting the discussion of management schools of thought based on a 'standard template'. This also seems to be the case with Donaldson (1995: 2).

[45] In a sense this (management) descriptive signature cuts across other (existing) (management) descriptive systems wherein it seeks to signify existing (management) descriptive meanings.

[46] Here I am highlighting two (management) descriptive systems. First, between class as the (management) descriptive signature signifying the common denominator as (management) descriptive meaning. And second, between elements and their properties as the (management) descriptive meanings that are signified by (management) descriptive signatures, which are different from that of class.

identify the (non-discernible) descriptive meanings to be made common and signify such meanings with a descriptive signature. Specifically, struggles over setting partitions involve (management) decisions taken either with or without criteria to identify those (management) descriptive meanings to be made common as content, and signified by a (management) descriptive signature, namely, rational, turbulent, cultural, emotional, power, and discursive.

If classifying is the principle of selection, it is also with the purpose of forming a unity. To this I now turn.

9   Constructing self and other identities

With Jung (1968: 275) forming a unity is the process[47] whereby 'a person becomes a psychological "in-dividual"', a no-longer-divided-unit, a wholeness (wherein there is the unification of the conscious and unconscious realms). The "individual" signifies the commonality of experience as the 'self-perceived inclusion of those who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by others' (De Vos, 1995: 18)[48]. The issue that emerges here is to understand how such undivided entities come to being as a result from partitioning.

If self and the (institutionalized) other, by reason of the authority that is vested in them, are involved with struggles over setting partitions, this struggle involves taking decisions with or without criteria to identify and establish common denominators signified by a (management) descriptive signature. But if the institutionalized instruments of expression that give authority for signifying, ordering and classifying experience are located in both the self and the other, there are no a priori grounds for partitioning self from another. This is because in identifying and establishing the common denominators to be signified by a (management) descriptive signature, this (management) descriptive signature may not be able to signify separately self and other since they are made to share a common denominator. Thus, to effectively partition self and other, there must be (at least) two (management) descriptive systems wherein the (management) descriptive signature signifies elemental and proprietary (management) descriptive meanings that are (separately)

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[47] Referred to as the 'process of individuation' by Von Franz (1964: 160).

[48] The idea or symbolism of the 'center' (Von Franz, 1964: 161; Eliade, 1991/1952: 41)

included in each system. That is, the common denominator must concern each system only and this denominator must be different from that of the other system.

This separation and inclusion of self and other seems to arise from the fact that "self" and "other" are signified orders[49]. They are described orders through the use of symbolic resources and language. It is a (temporarily) maintained order resulting from the struggle over partitions. If this is the case, it means that we come to experience this order as (temporarily) fixed[50]. To use Taylor (1996: 15), we internalize a (classified) memory that is (commonly) believed to exist. "Self" and "other" as order are therefore homogeneous as they centralize the conviction that the boundaries separating "self" from "other" must take the form that their content prescribes. *Anything* this content prescribes, I suggest.

Indeed, if it prescribes the unity and therefore differentiation between an individual self and another, "self" and "other" signify such a content. This boundary can be displaced by another (management) descriptive system to reveal another dichotomy, another "self" and another "other". When this occurs, to use Polanyi and Prosch (1975: 75, original emphasis), not only are the symbolic aspects integrated, but also 'the self becomes integrated as it is carried away by the symbol – or given *to* it'. In this manner we get a "self" (and other) signifying self and other. Thus regardless of how "self" and "other" are defined, order maintains their partition through an explicit boundary that results from classifying.

Seen from another viewpoint, "self" and "other" as defined partitions are identities because to use Morin (1991: 174), they comply with the maxim that 'being' cannot be 'non-being' as other (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1017a 30). If this is the case, it means that identities are constructed by the *in*-scription of an order that separates and integrates relative to what is meant. In this manner 'self-image' is created to use Keyes (1995: 151), a (management) descriptive signature to explain, understand and experience the world that surrounds us through language and (management) social practices to use Woodward (1997: 39).

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[49] As an illustration of this point, Collins (1998: 10-33) discusses schools of thought as unitary clusters.

[50] As an illustration of this point, for Collins (1998: 137, 169) and Donaldson (1995: 5) this order is qualified by coherence in the manner of thinking in various approaches and paradigms.

This means that individuation is moreover conditional. Forming a unity is conditioned on experiencing the world, a self in another. If this condition is satisfied, individuation is about internalizing the world, and in consequence both self and the other as both separate and included. This is an interchangeability of standpoints that promotes an essential unity and difference, the recognition of a common denominator premised on the identification of such a denominator. That is, the identification with outside figures in the attempt to position a self in relation to what is experienced as the other.

Overall, then three (general) outcomes emerge. Signified identities are constructed by the in-scription of an order that denotes coherence. Such an order, in enclosing descriptive meaning, is specific. It is a specificity that is signified by a descriptive signature relative to a unique content, which persuades us to consider and sense our surrounding in one way rather than another. Specifically, (management) identities are constructed by the in-scription of an order, which, in enclosing (management) descriptive meaning, is specific. It is this specificity that is signified by classified (management) descriptive signatures (namely, rational, turbulent, cultural, emotional, power, and discursive) relative to a unique and coherent content.

Identities thus emerge from selective persuasion, an inducement that defines unity. In making use of this quality that signifies any identity relative to the specificity of the content, (management) descriptive systems are used for the purpose of affirming a unity. Such an affirmation is premised on giving unity particular qualities, to construct a (management) descriptive signature to carry and signify these qualities.

To these (non-discernible) qualities I now turn.

10   Signifying qualities

If self and other, by virtue of the authority that is vested in them, are involved with struggles over setting partitions, this struggle involves taking decisions with or without criteria to signify identities by the in-scription of a coherent order that specifies (management) descriptive meanings. In this manner, a (management) descriptive system is effective in that it is able to fulfil a purpose, a realized purpose as outcome, to persuade us to consider and sense our

surrounding in one way rather than another, to direct meaning in unity, so as to signify this unity. It seems that selective persuasion that enables the affirmation of this unity by the (management) descriptive system is premised on three qualities, namely, authority, credibility and constancy.

Relative to authority, Bourdieu (1982: 152) notes that the effectiveness of a descriptive system does not lie in its illocutionary force after Austin or the charisma of the author after Weber. Rather, it lies in the dialectic between on the one hand the 'authored' in the sense of admissible and 'authoritative' language and on the other the dispositions of the audience that bestows such authority *(ibid.)*. Such a construction depends on the enunciating variables that give to pre-verbal, pre-reflective dispositions and ineffable experience an objective character in language, thereby becoming common, thus subject to (conditional) communication. There is, in other words, a strict relationship between a particular (management) descriptive system with its (management) descriptive signature, and the sentiments the system evokes.

One can therefore expect that a different (management) descriptive system evoke different sentiments. To transpose from Lincoln (in Schilbrack, 2002: 7) it seems that there is a separation between the ability a (management) descriptive system has to persuade and its ability to evoke sentiments. It could be the case that a (management) descriptive system awakens sentiments of likeness, attachment or on the contrary, of separation and distance regardless of the content. Regardless of the type of sentiment, the fact is one: a (management) descriptive signature awakens sentiments.

At stake here are sentiments of familiarity since authority in the sense of authenticity depends on constructing shared awareness and recognition. Such sentiments result from making reference to contents used in other (management) descriptive systems whose (management) descriptive signature signifies and qualifies origins, heroes, renewal, thereby validating the content of the system, not only relative to the most important facts, but also to the interpretation of the facts. Put simply, sentiments of familiarity arise from repetition when a (management) descriptive signature carries signifiers and qualifiers found in previous (management) descriptive signatures, thus a common denominator between them. In this way a (management) descriptive system is presented to its audience as 'truthful, intelligible

and meaningful' to transpose from Flood (2002: 178)[51], otherwise, it seems unlikely that a (management) descriptive system can 'possess both credibility and authority' to transpose again from Lincoln (in Schilbrack, 2002: 8).

Thus unless authority is able to evoke sentiments of familiarity through repetition, the likelihood of the system to act as a model is undermined. This is because authority is conditioned on credibility; the ability a (management) descriptive system has to make claims of truth, which is the second quality under consideration.

Credibility of a (management) descriptive system lies in the sequence of events involving the same principal actors, while being subject to the same overall interpretation and implied meaning. The same applies to the mediation of a (management) descriptive system in iconic forms, while being associated with collective ceremonies, rites, and venerated sites. In this way a (management) descriptive system becomes 'ideologically marked', to transpose from Flood (2002: 179) in that the (management) descriptive signature of the system carries the imprint of the assumptions, values, and goals associated with an ideal. If this is the case it means that its outcomes as realized purposes are premised on idealized purposes, the future outcomes. Credibility takes a future orientation, a promise that includes only what is there by virtue of the specified signifiers in use. Since the (management) descriptive signature is selected in virtue of the sought after effect, credibility, in this respect, arises from this action of selecting.

If credibility is a promise, it is a promise made in use. It is a promise that arises from the use of the (management) descriptive system. And if authority is able to evoke sentiments of familiarity through repetition, there is the re-production of a (management) descriptive system, and hence the constancy of its credibility. The re-production of a (management) descriptive system is attained by the correct interpretation of the (management) descriptive system in its use as true, in that it is (conditionally) communicated in a way that is appropriate. That is, without variation, regardless of the form.

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[51] For instance, it is clear that Donaldson (1995: 5) advances the issue of fragmentation on the basis of what exists since his aim is mainly to criticize such a tendency.

Credibility is by far not enough if there is repetition and re-production[52]. There has to be constancy or rather an ability to resist change, which is the third and final quality under consideration.

It is the (management) descriptive signature that tends to give a (management) descriptive system its richness and durability. Immediate richness of interpretive potential and persistence result from the continuous testing of a (management) descriptive system on various audiences over time, thus in its use. Durability of a (management) descriptive system therefore depends on the rejection of other potential systems as not being popular or when considered to be threatening.

This does not mean that a (management) descriptive system stays immutable. Rather, one can witness a developmental change in response to the audience, a process that Gerhart and Russell (2002: 198) call 'optimization'. Over time 'new interpretive possibility' *(ibid.)* opens up from the expectation that a (management) descriptive system may suddenly and discontinuously be subject to novel interpretation. At this moment there is anxiety that we are always in a position of coming close to understanding and signifying the human condition but never being able to reach it, a sentiment that gives rise to a continuous search for a novel interpretation[53]. This may not be radically different from any previous interpretations[54]. For Gerhart and Russell (2002: 199) the most important locus of change and continuity is in the interweaving of fact with fiction. To use Ricoeur (1988/1985: 192) if a descriptive system, rather than merely replicating reality, configures reality, there is a weaving together of fact and fiction. A (management) descriptive system is thereby valued for being truthful, which is independent from the truth-value of its (management) descriptive signature. Put simply, a (management) descriptive system is true *because* those who hold such a (management) description consider it to be true over time, repeatedly, albeit marginally different each time.

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[52] Without assuming a point of origin since this we cannot know.

[53] Blumenberg (in Gerhart and Russell, 2002: 198) thinks one should understand repetition as functioning instead like the limit that is approached by a mathematical function that converges asymptotically but never in fact arrives at a precise limit.

[54] Over larger periods of time one however one can witnesses a paradigmatic or epistemic change.

Overall then authority, credibility and constancy are qualities that enable the signification and affirmation of an identity (regardless of the content of such a unity). These constitute the power base of a (management) descriptive system in that we select (management) descriptive meanings (to form a (management) descriptive system) for the purpose of being influential, trustworthy, and consistent in the manner to persuasively describe experience to the other.

This is not carried out for its own sake. It occurs for a non-discernible purpose. The purpose of such an affirmation, I suggest, is to persuade the (signified and partitioned) other of the existence and coherence of an identity. This is the identity of the self or the other, the coherence of the (management) descriptive system signifying such a unity and of itself - of any unity. Simply put, it is the attempt to make the other *buy in* what is described, to entice the other.

11   Recruiting self and other

Classifying, simply put, makes a (management) descriptive system appealing relative to its discursive signature. A slightly more daring corollary I want to offer is that a (management) descriptive system makes itself appealing in that it is able to make itself recognizable, if it is unable to be recognized! In a sense, this is what Althusser (2001/1971: 118) has had in mind when stating that 'the hailed individual will turn around'. The question is to identify the one doing the hailing.

I suggest that it is not you or I recognizing our self in a (management) description, thus locating the origin of the act in ourselves. Rather, it is the (management) descriptive system that recognizes us! This is because a (management) descriptive system is there when we experience it. *We* experience a (management) descriptive system and it is not the (management) descriptive system that experiences us!

Thus if we persuasively describe experience to the other by means of a (management) descriptive system it is the latter that "does the job" for us. In so doing, a (management) descriptive system validates its signification, rationale and thus existence. To achieve this, it needs to recruit members by appealing to them as irrefutable. It needs to recruit you, the other and myself. It is not a matter of popularity as Callicott (2002: 171) concurs but a matter of authority,

credibility and constancy, qualities that enable the signification and affirmation of an identity. This endeavor is signified by the attempt to 'interpellate' according to Althusser (2001/1971: 118) or 'appellate' to use Goldman and Papson (1998: 35). In both cases it is about calling in, and getting noticed. It is about causing a questioning. For Billig (1991: 34) it is about summoning. It is the influence a (management) descriptive system has as rhetoric for the purpose of persuading. It is about (unconsciously) recruiting self and other to occupy a subject-position that affirms an identity. The issue that emerges at this point is to understand how this summoning takes place.

A first explanation lies with archetypal projections according to Gray (1996: 177), leading to mutual identification. Archetypes for Jung (1968: 4-5) are an explanatory paraphrase of the Platonic 'form' (ειδος) as an archaic remnant, as the deposit of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity. They can be seen as 'associative clusters' (Frye, 1957: 102) of the psyche which can be 'negatively distinguished from a personal unconscious by the fact that [they do] not, like the latter, owe [their] existence to personal experience' (Jung, 1968: 42). Jung *(ibid.)* further claims that the contents of the collective unconscious are *never* in consciousness. They are at a deeper level than that of the personal unconscious. Where the personal unconscious is made up of complexes, the collective unconscious is made up of archetypes. Stated differently, archetypes are collective (management) descriptions[55] because 'just as the human body shows a common anatomy over and above all racial differences, so, too, the human psyche possesses a common substratum transcending all differences in culture and consciousness' (Jung, 1998/1978: 63). Lévi-Straus (2000/1978: 15) makes a similar observation when stating, albeit in simpler terms, that 'the human mind is everywhere one and the same and that it has the same capacities'. This further indicates that archetypes are inherited, as they are '*patterns of instinctual behavior*' (Jung, 1968: 43, original emphasis). In this way one can argue for a commonality and repetition of (management) descriptive systems, in that the (management) descriptive system we hold is similar to that held by others[56].

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[55] 'Collective representations' (*représentations collectives*) according to Lévy-Bruhl (in Jung 1968: 5, 43).

[56] It is seen as the result of idealization during the 'mirror stage' following Lacan or Kristeva (in Oliver, 1998: 89).

Another explanation lies with doctrinal sets of ideas. For Foucault (1971: 44) doctrines 'put in common' (*mise en commun*) a unique set of (management) descriptive systems thereby defining mutual membership. Seemingly, the only required condition is the recognition of the same truth and the acceptance of a certain rule of conformity with validated speeches. Doctrines seem to be more than a confirmation for Foucault *(ibid.)*; otherwise they would not be any different from discipline. In this respect, doctrinal membership questions at the same time the 'subject spoken' (*énoncé*) and the 'speaking subject' (*sujet parlant*), and one via the other *(ibid.)*. Specifically, it questions the speaking subject through procedures of exclusion and the mechanisms of refusal which come into play when a speaking subject formulates one or several statements that cannot be apprehended. Further, doctrines question statements in that, as a (management) descriptive signature, they are the expression of a priori classification or typology. It follows that a (management) descriptive system with doctrinal appearance binds individuals to certain types of statement while forbidding their appurtenance to others. Overall with Foucault (1971: 45) a (management) descriptive system effects a double subjection, of speaking subjects to (management) descriptive systems, and of (management) descriptive systems to speaking subjects.

The discussion thus far shows that a (management) descriptive system is constructed *as if* acting as an observer who has replaced the observer through *substitution* ($\mu\varepsilon\tau\alpha\beta o\lambda\eta$). It is no longer the self or other who speaks but the (management) descriptive system. It is no longer the self or other describing the world but the (management) descriptive system. It is the (management) descriptive system that encodes and transmits observations in a way that the message acts as the delegate of that reality that includes self and other. Thus, a (management) descriptive system, from being *observed*, it just *observes*. And in observing the world, it objectifies the world. At the same time, from being thrown *in* observation (as object) it has become thrown *under* observation (as subject), thus subjected to the world. And as a (management) descriptive system has only one option, to signify and naturalize one side (since to naturalize both sides would undermine itself) there is tension between that which is signified and signification.

This explains why Hirst (in Hall, 1996: 7) has observed that "interpellation" assumes a priori capacity in individuals to recognize the subject-position before it is constructed because, following Shapiro (1998: 121), interpellation suggests that 'all human behavior is constrained within an ideological straitjacket'[57].

Moreover, "interpellation" does not say anything about the disbeliever. Transposing from Flood (2002: 181), those who consider a (management) descriptive system to be factually untrue may describe it in a pejorative sense. Among the disbelievers there may be those who broadly share the ideal that is marked by the (management) descriptive signature, but still believe the (management) descriptive meaning to be misleading relative to the experience it purports to describe. 'Ideological match', Flood *(ibid.)* has put it, 'does not guarantee belief. Neither does ideological mismatch guarantee disbelief'. Thus Flood attributes the likelihood of rejection to a different ideological orientation in that 'the more different the ideological orientation - the less comfortable the ideological fit between the telling and the receiving in a given situation - the more likely the rejection' *(ibid.)*. Hence a probability of subject-position mismatch, which explains the fact that some individuals occupy certain subject-positions rather that others according to Hall (1996: 10).

Given this probability, Ashcroft (in Shapiro, 1998: 121) has coined the term 'interpolation' to make some room for human agency in the sense that one can transgress the limitation of the (management) descriptive system in its ability to create subject-positions. If this is the case, it means that undermining one subject-position takes place through adopting another subject-position. It is difficult to argue for the absence of a subject-position, as this would signify the absence of

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[57] The problem for Shapiro (1998: 121) is not between choosing "interpolation" instead of "interpellation" or vice versa to account for explaining the adoption of a discursive viewpoint. It is the interpellation-interpolation dialogue itself, the battle concerned with 'choosing your words carefully and employing the kind of panache which a first class chef demonstrates whenever he spins his *(sic)* pizza on a single finger above his *(sic)* head!' Shapiro (1998: 118-123) displays aversion towards those neologisms and borrowings found in academic circles, explained by the tendency for neological construction in such circles. It seems to me that he is misplacing the interpellation-interpolation problematic by shifting emphasis from examining whether one has the ability or not to step outside from the normative content of (management) descriptions to the (management) description of postmodern neological tendencies.

a (management) descriptive system thus of (management) language. It could also be the case that the reason for transgressing a given set of limitations emanates from having occupied a particular subject-position a priori, thus speaking from an established subject-position.

Ability to transgress the normative content of a (management) descriptive system implies an awareness of this content and its effects, an appreciation of the content (and the possession and use of a source of power to effect such a transgression). This is not a simple matter! Being aware of a content requires an understanding of what exactly the (management) descriptive signature signifies. This requires adopting a standpoint that is located outside the (management) descriptive system from where we become observers of the (management) descriptive system. But if we resort to linguistic means to describe a (management) descriptive system from outside, if we are to observe a (management) descriptive system to become aware of a (management) descriptive system, the use of a (management) descriptive system is required. I therefore suggest that one can step outside a (management) descriptive system by means of a (management) descriptive system *only* by adopting a "meta" position. To use Morin (1991: 202) a 'meta-viewpoint' enables us to get closer to the fundamental aspects of experience and therefore enables us to judge the truth or falsity the (management) descriptive system purports to convey. To further use Hjelmslev (1961: 119), it is a situation of 'metasemiosis'.

Anyway, the use of a (management) descriptive system seems to be unavoidable. The function of a (management) descriptive system to construct subject-positions is preserved. It summons the self and the other. The issue at this point is to explore what happens when one is enticed by a (management) descriptive system.

12   Governing self and other identities

If enticing is linked with and premised on being influential, trustworthy, and consistent in a manner that intends describing experience, authority, credibility and constancy are related to action. They are to transpose from Giddens (1995: 214, original emphasis) 'bound up with the notion of *praxis*' because power is an 'element of action' equivalent to 'the *transformative capacity* of human action'. Put simply, they serve the purpose of directing action. Seen from

outside it is *as if* a (management) descriptive system governs identities. Let me now elaborate on this point.

The power base of a (management) descriptive system works on the subjectivity of individuals. This subjectivity is the 'object' that is developed (Du Gay, 1997b: 294) through 'technologies of conduct regulation' and control that entail the application of 'government' (Miller & Rose, 1997a/1990: 330).

"Government" for Rose (1996: 134), following Foucault, refers to methodical strategies and programs responsible for the direction and regulation of the behavior of individuals according 'mentalities' of rule so as to achieve a desired objective. A (management) descriptive system as a rational mentality recruits members on the basis of truth. It is a unique ideal to interpret any question, topic or concern. Further, such mentalities are political in the sense that, in naturalizing the social, they construct knowledge and all actions thereof that is hegemonic, as they exclude the signification of alternative (management) descriptive meanings. This implies that (management) descriptive systems make use of 'arborescent' and 'rhizomatic' technologies, to use Deleuze and Guattari (1988/1980: 3-25), being (at times) structured, and (other times) unstructured mechanisms and regulatory interventions. These 'shape normalize and instrumentalize the conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the objectives they consider desirable' (Miller & Rose, 1997a/1990: 326). It is a question of providing direction. Here lies the essence of the subject as *existing under* (υποκειμενον), as being, to use Foucault (in Best & Kellner, 1991: 50) 'subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to … by a conscience of self-knowledge'.

This however can be either contrasted or similar to self-actualization, that what Nietzsche (in May, 1983: 79) considers to be an affirmation in and of one's existence with strength and commitment; an inseparable aspect of being that does not refer to aggression or competitive striving. That is, as informed by a (management) descriptive system when one is subjected by this system. It follows that there is a double process of government, of others and of oneself.

Put simply, subjected individuals recognize the other in sameness. This recognition is about leading self and other to

unambiguously believe in the meanings that the (management) descriptive system presents as true.

Put simply, a dichotomy does not only concern the self, but also biological, ethnic, political, or economic issues whose partition is signified when there is the recognition of a coincidence between order and boundary. This is a point that Gellner (1994: 35) has made when speaking of the construction of a national identity and to transpose his claim, the construction of an economic identity arises from the belief that those who belong to an economic order should be within an economic boundary.

And to further transpose his claim, it seems to me that identities constitute another classifying (management) descriptive signature to signify and qualify a group of individuals in through an institutionalized order. An institution or a group of persons that includes self and other becomes an *in*-dividual, the other relative to another self.

To effect this, a shared idea one has of one's group as well as about the included other is needed. Hence the construction of what Anderson (in Woodward, 1997: 18) has called 'imagined community' based on the individual need for a 'collective continuity' (De Vos, 1995: 25) and resorting to 'stereotyping' as 'signifying practice' (Hall, 1997b: 257) - a strategy for fixing both the identity and the dualism us-them. Identities are thus made functional in the attempt to rally those who pledge allegiance to the (management) descriptive signature that carries the definition of such identities. This is seems to occur, Woodward (1997: 30) explains, because a common language facilitates the construction of similar classificatory systems, and the 'accommodation' of the members of the same group (De Vos, 1995: 15).

Since partitioning and the establishment of an order is about leveling out differences, there is a continuum between past, present and future senses of belonging for De Vos (1995: 18).

Other factors are equally at play in encouraging a sense of commonality. The first one, to use Gilroy (1997: 307) is the production and consumption of common aesthetic traditions such as rites and ceremonies by the members of a group. One can add, with De Vos (1995: 18-19), the practice of endogamy that perpetuates genetically inherited differences whether real or imagined thus constituting a common ancestry. And more important are for Schwartz

(1995: 50) the practices that members see as 'ethnognomonic' in that, like totemism, they are cultural and emblematic traits specific to one group (in contrast to another). The final step is to construct a sense of 'ecological belongingness' (Gilroy, 1997: 316-317) to coincide territory with dichotomy wherein the shared content can be expressed in a spatially fixed location for De Vos (1995: 16).

13   Totalization and dominance

It is clear from the above discussion that classifying the in-dividual, regardless of the elements contained in this unity an identic (management) descriptive system signifies wholeness in that it marks complexity in a totalizing manner. This is a point that seems to underlie the claim that a (management) descriptive system 'places the experience of man *(sic)* in a whole that receives orientation and meaning from the narration' according to Ricoeur (1969/1967: 6). Lévi-Straus (in Ricoeur, 1969/1967: 6) has equally pointed out such a signified totality when stating that 'the Universe signified long before man began to know what it signified … ; it signified from the beginning the totality of what humanity might expect to know about it'. The consequences of totalization are twofold.

First, a (management) descriptive system decides upon the particular semiotic structures it needs for vehicle, a decision that impoverishes the linguistic relationship by reducing and transforming its contingency to fixity to use Barthes (1993/1957: 117). Second, it naturalizes praxis in exactly the way the system describes it to follow Lidchi (170-178: 183). They become to use Miller (1995: 20) 'clichés', rigid and, at times, uncompromising descriptors[58].

The combined effect of these two consequences is that the power base of a (management) descriptive system results in the progressive standardization of capturing experience. A (management) descriptive system then can be seen to *simulate reality* ($\mu\iota\mu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$), in that, as a free-floating 'signification' to use Barthes (1993/1957: 117), it seems completely isolated from the complexity it describes as it lacks any real signification. In this manner it is an attempt to

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[58] This is the case with defining the 'economy' unambiguously as the domain where management practices are merely concerned with how people use resources to fulfil organizational and personal desires according to Davis and Meyer (1998: 2).

constitute experience and not state what it is to use Laclau (1990: 82). It is an attempt to constitute identities[59].

Such constitution is expressed in the emergence of a common (management) descriptive system that regulates social and private life in similar ways across the globe, hence the 'McDonaldisation' of the world to use Ritzer (1998: 1-2). In other words, in constructing a total representation of experience, the (management) descriptive system *only* highlights those aspects it considers relevant. Simply put those that can be included into its system. Unfamiliar objects are simply and purely rejected.

This means that the experiential plane is *not* wholly and totally accounted for. It is a situation that opens up a space wherein experience is in need of being conceptualized and explained: descriptive meanings are in search of descriptive signatures. A descriptive system has created its opposite, its inverse and competing image. Specifically, when (management) descriptive meanings are in search of (management) descriptive signatures the (management) descriptive system has created its (non-exhaustive) competing images thus, the identified (management) descriptive signatures, namely, rational, turbulent, cultural, emotional, power, discursive, and moreover besides.

An explanation for this lies in the very obsession of a (management) descriptive system to maintain, if one follows Ricoeur (1975: 52), order and coherence – its power base. A (management) descriptive system appears as a "logical metaphor" that fixes the terms it refers to. It directs processes aiming at consolidating replicability, predictability, and the re-assurance that both the content and values remain the same.

As a logical metaphor a (management) descriptive system, nevertheless, has to solve a difficulty, namely, the "as-if" predication which is characteristic of its function. It must avoid exposing its own irrationalities arising from the contingency of language games, while retaining the ability to offer new categories and schemata. Although it

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[59] It is no surprise then to hear critics, notably Baudrillard (1998/1970: 193) to argue that 'the consumer society ... is itself its own myth' implying that one lives in a (management) myth and is governed by (management) myth. For Baudrillard there is one single myth that pervades society. If one accepts this argument, it means that in being governed by one single myth, any myth we think of as different is just a shadow of the former. We live in a myth-ology.

has no means of reducing the fact of contingency, it can only provide a specific mode of rendering conscious the contingency of language, existence, and history. In this situation of agitation, a (management) descriptive system risks simply and purely to become reified, and therefore lose its "as-if" status.

To get out of this situation, a (management) descriptive system must find a lens, along with the "what-if" predication, to reduce polysemy within a given context. It is the context that operates this selection, silently. In this way, a (management) descriptive system questions itself. I would like to suggest with Ricoeur (1975: 93) following Saussure, that it is progressively creating a difference so as to render meaningful its existence.

However, the more a (management) descriptive system seeks to recapture meaning, the more the fissure appears to build wide. The (management) descriptive system is total and at a distance from its opposites. When two or more (management) descriptive systems are found one facing the other, a battle over hegemony ensues to use Gramsci (1971: 12-13).

In this hierarchical situation the (management) descriptive system uses its discursive signature to govern other (management) descriptive systems, those carried by others, as the very presence of multinary opposition renders the environment wherein a (management) descriptive system exists hostile for its survival.

To govern other systems, a (management) descriptive system uses its own discursive signature to fix knowledge and its enactment by the vehicles that carry it. Thus the power of a (management) descriptive system resides in its capacity to convince that its logic is superior relative to that presented by its opponents. There is a tendency for power to be centered in poles.

In this manner, power radiates unproblematically from one pole and finds its application in the other, hence a power asymmetry where one of the (management) descriptive systems attempts to yield more power than the others do. It is an echo of a concept of power according to which 'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests' (Lukes, 1974: 27). The term 'interests' may be the overt expression of wants and preferences (one-dimensional view), or include covert wants and preferences (two-dimensional view) or be the product of a system (three-dimensional view) (Lukes, 1974: 34-35).

For Giddens (1995: 199), this conceptualization leads to a 'zero-sum situation' and not to dominance (and therefore hierarchy). This is because power differentials inevitably entail conflicts of interest. These are incompatible interests, which arise from the fact that each (management) descriptive system has the capability to realize its own aims. With Giddens *(ibid.)* then, the criterion for measuring such power is the resistance effected by the other pole. And if power is about applying a transformative capacity, a change from resistance to dominance must occur to lead and 'direct' (*dominare*) to use Gramsci (1971: 55).

To join Bourdieu, this expresses the attempt to establish legitimate authority to impose meaning, and occurs when the (management) descriptive system is institutionalized, when it is brought in a position of power that gives definite material and psychological advantages. That is, when there is order, partition and classification.

At this point a (management) descriptive system seeks to establish a relationship of comparison for difference. At first, it attempts to find in its opponent points of reference and similarity to show that there is little difference between its meaning and that of its opponent. Being on a par with its opponent, power is decentred. The (management) descriptive system has created a smooth and open space of change, to use Best and Kellner (1991: 100), where *anything* by definition is possible.

At this point, to use Barthes (1993/1957: 133), the (management) descriptive system 'tries to transform the sign back into meaning ... This is why it clouds the language, ..., and stretches to the limit the link between signifier and signified'. And because it is such an 'open-work structure' *(ibid.)*, the (management) descriptive system quickens to render its structure closed and therefore dichotomous where there is *only one possible issue*: a clear distinction between its system and that of its opponents.

The above discussion shows that (management) descriptive systems tend to maintain and nurture binary oppositions not only in terms of what they stand for, the underlying principles, but also in terms of the values they convey. They naturalize the artificial constitution of centers for meaning and identity construction in opposing poles. They naturalize power games, power asymmetries, and multinary oppositions, so as to dissolve ambiguous contents.

The end effect of these tricks is to highlight what is obvious: to separate so as to establish a unity, a common denominator, thus construct classes and clusters of what otherwise would not be unitary. Put simply, a (management) descriptive system classifies experience in fullness to impose a hegemonic order for its survival.

14   Validation and specification

It is time now to describe the findings regarding the validation of the existence of identified (general) outcomes in addition to rendering these specific, which is my third and last heuristic aim. Let me start by summarizing the findings thus far.

The first heuristic aspect concerned experiencing and describing management re-presented experiences in key concerns. It has been found that rational, turbulent, cultural emotional, power and discursive concerns are carried by a (management) descriptive signature, which sets them apart in a partition that is overall signified by "management".

The second heuristic aspect concerned observing and describing what management re-presented experiences do to me as the common denominator underpinning such re-presentations. It has been found that we select (management) descriptive meanings for the purpose of being authoritative, credible, and constant so as to construct identifiable entities for the purpose of easing the recruitment of members in a situation of a total (management) description of experience.

It is important to note however the similarity between the two sets of findings. The descriptive signatures of the discursive and power contents seem to be similar to that of the identified outcomes, in that the realized purpose as outcome and as a (management) concern is mainly about credibility, persuasion and constancy for the purpose of enticing (organizational) members as a function of power. Consequently, what has been found as the common denominator of all (management) descriptive systems, if all (management) descriptive systems are used for the same (realized) purpose, *is* a specific (management) descriptive system (or a set of (management) descriptive systems). For this to be the case and considering the totalizing tendencies of (management) descriptive systems, there must

be a hierarchy of purposes within each (management) descriptive systems and between them.

To therefore validate the claim that we describe for a purpose, for a specific set of (realized) purposes as the sought after effects as outcomes, I must set out a hierarchy of such purposes (and therefore establish a hierarchy of concerns thus of (management) descriptive signatures). This is to use credibility, persuasion and constancy as the power base of any (management) descriptive system, as a common denominator for the purpose of enticing (organizational) members as a function of power, which means that such enticement takes place for a purpose. This supreme purpose can be signified by "direction" in the (simplest) sense that we use (management) descriptive systems to direct and dominate meaning – refer to the appendix for further details.

The data collected yield three main sets of findings. First, that overall, (management) descriptive meanings and hence (management) descriptive systems are indeed selected for a purpose. Second, that the supreme purpose for which management practice is described is to provide direction (signified by the turbulent descriptive signature)[60], which confirms the outcome that if power is about applying a transformative capacity, it is for the purpose to dominate. Third, that among the management concerns those that display a power and discursive content are the most coherent as descriptive systems even though they tend to be the least favored – thus at a distance from management praxis hence having the lowest experiential visibility. Being the most coherent, these descriptive systems manage to signify unity, of themselves, whereas the others to a lesser extent.

The combination of these findings point towards the validation of the claim that we select (management) descriptive meanings and therefore (management) descriptive signatures to form a unique (management) description as (management) myth-to-be for the purpose of being authoritative, credible, and constant. These three purposes, in turn, exist for the purpose of making the other buy in what is described and therefore being directed by such a total (management) description in dominance.

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[60] There seems to be little difference in this respect along the gender divide.

III

15   Logics in brief

Having established and validated the outcomes (what a description does) as realized purpose (why a description does what it does), I now turn to describing the logics (how a description does what it does)[61] as an explanation for the existence of identified outcomes.

Briefly, a (management) descriptive system exists for the purpose of generating meaning, the signified experience and concerns. It therefore bears a "*functional logic*". This logic is however delimited by the very purpose that gives the (management) descriptive system its existence. It informs the choice of the (management) descriptive signature by rarefying language in a way so as to signify meaning from the chosen and unique (management) descriptive signature. It therefore bears a "*discursive logic*". The exclusion of other meanings informs the construction of a particular view of experience as being unique. It therefore bears a "*paradigmatic logic*". Acting as an exemplar, a (management) descriptive system is ready to direct and organize social practice in an efficient manner. It therefore bears a "*hyper-rational logic*".

Let me now describe these logics in some detail.

16   Functional logic

If a (management) descriptive system exists for the purpose of generating specific meaning, it is available for appropriation and use. Thus, to transpose from Hatab (1990: 20-21), a (management) descriptive system is functional as it is 'woven into the concrete lives of people'. In *this* manner a (management) descriptive system is given the role of speaking on behalf of what people experience as concrete.

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[61] Note that it is not enough to give an account of logic as being either one and only or all encompassing and signified by the 'logic of language' considering that a descriptive system is plainly language. This is because such an approach omits the ways in which language is organized in its use. It is therefore necessary to speak of a number of logics in the sense that there exist a number of linguistic routines, modes and processes.

At the same time this role is played in the present, as occurring, while a (management) descriptive system bears the traces of an origin and a multitude of events thereof. So does language in general. Put simply, a (management) descriptive system plays a metaphorical and historical role. In what follows then I discuss the notion of "*metaphoricity*" mainly with Ricoeur and Black, and that of "*historicity*" with Cassirer as the qualitative roles that a (management) descriptive system plays.

Relative to the first notion, Cassirer (1953/1946: 86)[62] sees in metaphor 'the conscious denotation of one thought content by the name of another which resembles the former in some respect, or is somehow analogous to it'. A (management) descriptive system is then a genuine translation of two concepts which is reminiscent of the conceptualization given by Aristotle (*Poetics*, 1457b 6-9) in that a 'metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else'. It is moreover 'the transference … from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy' *(ibid.)*.

Ricoeur (1975: 20) points out that for Aristotle there is a relationship between, on the one hand metaphor and 'discourse' ($\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$), and on the other, between metaphor and linguistic 'parts' ($\mu\epsilon\rho\eta$)[63]. The latter use of metaphor implies that 'both the ideas and their verbal correlates are already given as definite quantities' (Cassirer, 1953/1946: 87).

Despite the critique, a few pages on, Cassirer (1953/1946: 96) does acknowledge that such practice is common when stating that

> [i]f we suppose that the element emphasized in the name, and therefore in the verbal concept of "bird", as an essential characteristic was the element of "flight", then by virtue of this element and by its mediation the butterfly does belong to the class of birds. Our own languages are still constantly producing such classifications, which contradict our empirical and scientific concepts of species and genera, as for instance the

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[62] Concerned with deciding whether there is the priority of language over (management) mythology or (management) myth over language.

[63] For Ricoeur (1975: 20) it is the second relationship that has prevailed, although his concern is mainly with the first one.

denotation "butterfly" (*botervlieg*), in some Germanic tongues called a "butterbird".

In other words, both a (management) descriptive system and what it refers to are fixed and defined as they can they be translated one into another.

This implies substitution, which operates within imitation[64]. Accordingly, the function and focus of the metaphor 'is to communicate a meaning that might have been expressed literally', Black (1962: 31) claims. It exists to remedy linguistic faults by attaching new signifieds onto existing signifiers, therefore becoming a part of denotation. To avoid fixity, but also to rescue imitation from the tension operated by 'distanciation' (*écart*), Ricoeur (1975: 239) sees metaphor as the 'shift' from the literal sense to the figurative sense, giving metaphoric signs an 'immediate' and 'mediate' qualification[65]. For Black (1962: 37) however analogy and similarity quickly amount to synonymy and therefore suggests after Richards, to consider metaphor as in interaction producing meaning[66].

These arguments show clearly the rapprochement between metaphor and a (management) descriptive system in that a (management) descriptive system is given to play a metaphoric function. Moreover a historic function since, as Cassirer (1972/1944: 173) points out, time in (management) myth 'has no definite structure' because 'the past has never passed away; it is always here and now'.

Historicity here should be understood as a (management) descriptive system bearing traces of history. At the same time historicity is a-historical, devoid of particular historical references, which enables a (management) descriptive system to be relevant at any point in time, hence temporal. It can therefore be re-interpreted, a process that is never complete, since no sooner an objectivity as center is constituted, than our judgements about it must be revised to use Cassirer (1972/1944: 174).

A (management) descriptive system however *is* history in itself, belonging to the past as completed action, as an 'act' (Schutz, 1967/1932: 39-40), in that as (management) description of experience

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[64] The 'substitution view of metaphor' as Black (1962: 31) calls it.

[65] The 'comparison view of metaphor' that Black (1962: 35) highlights.

[66] Hence the 'interaction view of metaphor' that Black (1962: 38) considers.

it is constructed as a function of experience, hence of time. In this respect Ricoeur (1984/1983: 3) remarks[67] that time and narrative as the descriptive means of experience are related in that

> time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience.

Indeed, in considering the parallel between "narrative" and "metaphor" in that both are concerned with semantic innovation aiming at grasping into a totality scattered events thereby producing a pattern, Ricoeur (1984/1983: 53) sees both of them to play a 'mimetic function' ($\mu\iota\mu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$), a metaphoric function. It is 'the concrete process by which the textual *configuration* [mimesis 2] mediates between the *prefiguration* of the practical field [mimesis 1] and its *refiguration* through the reception of the work [mimesis 3]' (*ibid.*, my emphases). To put it differently, the manner in which texts are shaped articulates the capturing of experience in (management) descriptions and the use of (management) descriptions in experience. This entails the ordering of time in a narrative with its logical structure that orders time, moreover contingency, probability, necessity, and events to further use Ricoeur (1984/1983: 207-208). A (management) descriptive system to use Heidegger (1962/1926: 377)[68] mediates the 'temporal time of experiencing' (*zeilichkeit*) whose 'essence is a process of temporalizing'.

It follows that historicity lies in the dialectic between time and the (management) description of what experience is or should be[69]. A (management) descriptive system which bears a temporal trace relative to the events it describes, structures (management) experience as *action* ($\pi\rho\alpha\xi\iota\varsigma$) in a sedimented form, while experience involves

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[67] This is an attempt to articulate the Augustinian analysis of time and the Aristotelian analysis of plot.

[68] And hence the unity of being and becoming.

[69] In this way, it is hoped, the 'dissymmetry between historic narrative and fictional narrative' (Ricoeur (1988/1985: 5) each with its own use of time, is resolved. This claim is made on grounds that although the (management) myth guiding them may be different from a content viewpoint, both make reference to histories. That is, to events and personae captured at some time in the past, in language and are presented, rendered public to be experienced as present (management) descriptions. Such has also been Ricoeur's endeavor.

the interplay of newness, of innovation and sedimented experience, an action of co-ordination.

With the above two arguments it becomes clear that the metaphoric and historic functions a (management) descriptive system put into form 'reason and passion as two necessarily related aspects of lived experiences' (Anderson, 2002: 101). Put simply, a (management) descriptive system is an instrument whose purpose is the (management) description and mediation of (management) experience *in* and *off* time. If it were not for this function, a (management) descriptive system would not have the effects it has. It would not be able to classify experience and the world around us including self and other so as to construct an intelligible order of identities.

17   Discursive Logic

This is because a (management) descriptive system is a system of exclusion which tends to 'condense' (Barthes, 1991/1982: 37) meaning and fix difference by separating the normal from the unacceptable thus acquiring an ethical content. A (management) descriptive system has a discursive logic. To expound this point further, I examine "*discursivity*" with Laclau and Mouffe, and then with Foucault, "*rarefaction*" as the qualities of a (management) descriptive system to direct meaning generation by excluding other ways in which (any) experience could be conceptualized.

Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 100) start by emphasizing that every social configuration is meaningful, in that systems of relations, whether these are between objects or individuals, or between them, are socially constructed[70]. It is this set of relations that they call "discourse".

It is important to point out that this does not imply putting the existence of objects into question, as they exist independently of any system of social relations; their existence is 'extraneous to any meaning' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1990: 101). This constitutes the point of departure of social analysis. Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 100) further

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[70] They moreover emphasize that 'if I kick a spherical object in the street or if I kick a ball in a football match, the physical fact is the same, but its meaning is different. The object is a football only to the extent that it establishes a system of relations with other objects' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1990: 100).

argue that it is the discourse, which constitutes the subject position of the social agent; it is not the social agent who is the origin of discourse[71]. This, however, leaves two problems unsolved. The first concerns the distinction between meaning and action and the second the (management) description of entities that are outside the (management) descriptive system.

Starting with the former, Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 101) argue that the distinction between meaning and action amounts to the separation between semantics and pragmatics[72]. This separation however becomes blurred since the meaning of a word is seen to be entirely use-dependent, especially with Wittgenstein (2001/1953: §432, original emphases) when claiming that 'every sign *by itself* seems dead. *What* gives it life? – In use it is *alive*. Is life breathed into it there? - Or is the *use* its life?' In other words, meaning and use are intimately and inextricably related. Pitkin (in Laclau & Mouffe, 1990: 101) points out that the 'meaning is learned from, and shaped in, instances of use; so both its learning and its configuration depend on pragmatics'. And concludes that 'semantic meaning is compounded out of cases of a word's use, including all the many and varied language games that are played with it, so meaning is very much the product of pragmatics'. Yet if every discursive object is constituted in the context of an action it follows that every non-linguistic action also has a meaning. With Laclau & Mouffe *(ibid.)* one finds within a non-linguistic action 'the same entanglement of pragmatics and semantics that we find in the use of words'.

Concerning the second problem, Laclau & Mouffe *(ibid.)* argue that 'natural facts are also discursive facts'. This is because the idea of nature is not simply there: it needs a language to be described. But language in use is the result of complex historical and social evolutionary trends, and therefore any (management) description of a natural object depends upon a classificatory system[73].

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[71] As Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 100) aptly point out 'the same system of rules that makes that spherical object into a football, makes me a player'.

[72] Here applies the distinction between semantics - dealing with the meaning of words, syntactics - dealing with the meaning word orders, and pragmatics - dealing with the way words are used in certain speech contexts (Laclau & Mouffe, 1990: 101).

[73] Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 101, my emphasis) point out 'this does not put into question the fact that this entity which we call stone exists, in the sense of being present here and now, independently of my will;

Yet, classifying and organizing objects implies a system that operates reductions and transfigurations. This is an institution according to Foucault (1971: 9), as it seeks to comfort us by imposing 'ritualized forms' (*formes ritualisées*). It is the tendency to maintain order, to bring us back in discourse, to decide on the appearance of discourses, to provide them with a place and to empower them. Foucault (1971: 10-11) therefore believes that 'in all society the production of discourse is controlled, sifted, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures'.

To start with, 'systems of exclusion' (*procédures d'exclusion*) (Foucault, 1971, 11-23) which are external to the discourse.

The first and the most familiar one is interdiction (*intérdit*), in the sense that we cannot say anything we want, under any circumstance. Complex networks of tabooed objects, circumstantial rituals and privileged rights of the speaking subject, all three types of interdictions that make that discourse is the premise wherein power is exclusive. Discourse is seemingly trivial but the interdictions that befall it show its relation with desire and power, in that it is neither just that which desire expresses, nor that which is expressed by a dominating system, but that through which one struggles, the power one seeks to seize.

Empowered discourse is therefore the site and the cause for 'separation' (*partage*) and 'rejection' (*rejet*)[74], the second principle of exclusion, which consists in the disunion into binary opposites, the institutionalized discourse and its antithesis. Separating truth from falsity therefore becomes difficult, as there are no grounds for associating one pole with truth and the other with falsity. And when the institutionalized discourse is invested by desire, when it seizes what is a yearning for escaping from discourse, thereby blotting out, it becomes all-powerful, unique. Foucault notes (1971: 16) that the separation of truth from falsity is 'neither arbitrary nor modifiable,

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nevertheless the fact of its being a *stone* depends on a way of classifying objects that is historical and contingent'.

[74] Foucault (1971: 12-14) opposes reason with folly in that the discourse of the insane can neither be circulated nor given credit in the same manner as that of the sane. Interesting enough it is through the discourse of the insane that insanity is revealed therefore distinguished from sanity. Although we have learned how to listen to the insane, according to Foucault (*ibid.*), this does not mean that the distinction has disappeared: modern scientific discourses arrive at the same result.

neither institutional nor violent'. The separation ceases to exist; what is left is one discourse which dominates, that pronounced by right and according to the required ritual.

Further, there are systems of 'discursive rarefaction' (*raréfaction du discours*) (Foucault, 1971: 23-38), which are internal to any discourse as having or being a self-regulatory system.

The first concerns the 'commentary' (*commentaire*), the narratives that are repeated and varied, as ritualized sets of discourses that are recounted in specific events, regardless of the type of text[75]. What is peculiar to commentaries is infinite creativity and variation of a central theme, of a discursive function, that of transferring from one individual to another, across people, cultures and ages, a commonly perceived concern, an interrogation on the world and one's existence[76].

This brings in the 'author', not as individual, but rather as principle for ordering discourses, for maintaining coherence and unity, the second principle of discursive rarefaction. Where commentary limits any discursive unpredictability through repetition, the author limits this uncertainty through the definition of the id.

Order implies typology, a limitation through the establishment of 'disciplines' (*disciplines*), the third principle of discursive rarefaction, which consist in a 'domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of true propositions, a set of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments' (Foucault, 1971: 32). He further notes that although a discipline enables the formulation and re-formation of novel discourses, it is different from commentaries in that the former does not involve repetition. It is further different from the author, in that there is absence of the author in a discipline: it is an anonymous endeavor. The important point concerning disciplines is that as a corpus of true propositions they are the least exhaustive as they cannot be considered to be the sum of all what is or can be told about a concern or an object of study. The reasons are twofold. First, that not all true propositions are or can be considered to be true by all, a residue that brings about innovation, and second, that not all true

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[75] Foucault (1971: 24) does not make any distinction as per the type of text: all commentaries are or can be narrated forms of discourse whether the texts are religious, legal, literary or even scientific.

[76] Foucault (1971: 26) gives as example Ulysses as primary text whose discourse and concern is repeated and changed in various texts inclusive of Joyce's.

propositions are or can be inscribed into a specified theory, or paradigm, with its codes of acceptability. Stated differently, true propositions must fit the discipline a priori[77], hence a means for controlling discursive production, which leads to the exclusion of possibly true propositions.

This also means that no one can enter into discourse unless one is qualified to do so[78], hence the systems of rarefaction of the 'speaking subjects' (*sujets parlants*) (Foucault, 1971: 39).

The effect of these three systems of rarefaction is that not all the meanings that could be signified by a (management) descriptive signature in a system are actually signified. Put simply, some are, others not. It is a question of purpose: the selection of (management) descriptive meanings and systems is presumed on what we expect them to do for us. It is about activating, so to put it, their functional logic for the purpose of being convincing. We are brought to buy in the (management) descriptive system as (management) myth-to-be.

18   Paradigmatic Logic

The conceptualization of "discipline" that Foucault has put forward approximates that of 'paradigm' in the sense given by Kuhn (1996/1962: 175) as 'the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community'[79]. To develop this idea in the context of a (management) descriptive system as (management) myth-to-be, I look at "*exemplarity*" with Kuhn and then "*nuclearity*" with Morin, as the qualities of a (management) descriptive system to account for

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[77] The example Foucault (1971: 26-37) gives is that of Mendel: what he discovered in terms of heredity was true, or as so it has been proven, but he was not 'in the truth' (*dans le vrai*) as his propositions did not fit the disciplinary truisms of his day.

[78] Although Foucault (1971: 42) acknowledges that in some societies the social comportment was more regulated than in contemporary societies, in the latter, despite the presence of open discourses which implies the dissociation between discourse and ritual, ritualistic forms still exist since our society is doctrinal.

[79] To some extent it also approximates similar notions notably that of 'map' used by Huntington (1996: 30), 'worldview' used by Landman (1996: 90), or 'ideology' after Shils (in its non-Marxist tradition and not based on the criterion of truth and falsity) as per Boudon (1989: 23).

completeness in communication and unanimity of judgements in describing experience.

The starting point for Kuhn (1996/1962: 176-177) is 'community', which exists because of an implicit or explicit sharing of a paradigm. This is the result of common education and professional initiation, an understanding of similar literature, hence a boundary that marks the concerns of the community. Communities as disciplines are the 'producers and validators of scientific knowledge' (Kuhn, 1996/1962: 178)[80].

Thus 'a paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men *(sic)* who share a paradigm' (Kuhn, 1996/1962: 176). A similar conceptualization has been put forward by Jewett and Lawrence (1977: 250).

This however creates a situation of competition because the entire scientific parameters are determined by the nature of the dominant paradigm. Under competition, the parameters may be radically changed with the advents of a new paradigm, which is a distinctly political phenomenon for Kuhn (1996/1962: 93-94). The (non-) emergence of a paradigm is thus attributed to political factors rather than to the relative scientific merits of the paradigms. This is not to deny that the latter are important. Rather, a paradigm cannot gain hegemony without first engaging in, and ultimately winning, the political conflict. It can also be the case that a paradigm that is generally seen as scientifically less valuable or useful can first gain and then maintain hegemony through political means. Ritzer (2001: 59) explains that for Kuhn 'one paradigm wins out over another because its supporters have more power than those who support competing paradigms and not necessarily because their paradigm is "better" than its competitors'.

Put another way, paradigms evolve as a result of political factors, which, so to put it, discipline paradigms. Kuhn (1996/1962: 182) however views the equation paradigm with discipline as not

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[80] It is worth noting that Kuhn (1996/1962: 178, 179) remarks that without this sharing, the arguments made in his book would not have been understood by the scientific community to which it is addressed. Kuhn, in other words points towards the correspondence between the (management) myth held by the writer and that of the beholder of any form of (management) description, an interaction that is not static however.

appropriate. Primarily because it makes science appear to be irrational – he prefers instead to use the term 'disciplinary matrix' – "disciplinary" referring to shared knowledge and "matrix" referring to ordered elements. In this way paradigms are constituents of a disciplinary matrix. Further, for Kuhn (1996/1962: 182-187) a disciplinary matrix consists of symbolic generalizations or models - expressions cast in logical forms, commitments to metaphysical beliefs, and values providing a sense of community.

If a paradigm is a constitutive part of the disciplinary matrix and no longer equated with discipline, it must be with exemplar, with shared example. "Paradigm" 'denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solution which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science' (Kuhn, 1996/1962: 175). The rationale that Kuhn (1996/1962: 188, 191) presents is that without exemplars neither knowledge consolidation can occur, no tacit knowledge can be constructed, and therefore no experience and intuition; thus, the creation of a sense of community cannot occur.

Both positions held by Kuhn are found in Ritzer (2001: 61) for whom a paradigm is an exemplar, or a body of work that stands as a model for those who work within the paradigm. Further, it is an image of the subject matter, and it consists of theories while referring to the methods and instruments used. In short, Ritzer equates paradigm with both discipline and exemplar. Thus a (management) descriptive system in its paradigmatic function acts as an exemplar in the way it classifies thought and actions.

It is with Morin (1991: 211) that the paradigmatic logic of a (management) descriptive system[81] is located in its (linguistic) nucleus, the discursive signature. Taking on Kuhn and especially Foucault, for Morin (1991: 213) a paradigm

> incorporates, for each discourse that is effected under its empire, the fundamental concepts or the master categories of intelligibility as well as the type of logical relations of

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[81] As a matter of precision, Morin addresses theories and systems of ideas, rather than a (management) descriptive system as (management) myth-to-be. Although the latter seem to play an important role in the generation of ideas, they seem to be more of nuisance for Morin (1991: 125, 142) since we are witnessing the 're-invasion of myth and even religion in systems of ideas which are apparently rational'.

attraction/repulsion (conjunction, disjunction, implication or others) between these concepts or categories.

In other words, there is not only a semantic but also logical and ideological focus of the paradigm with Morin. Semantically, a paradigm determines meaning. Through logic it determines the logical operations. With these two functions, a paradigm determines the conditions of the organization of ideas.

Morin (1991: 216-217) goes on to offer explicit features of a paradigm. To start with, it cannot be falsified as it displays an axiomatic authority. Further, it is able to exclude not only information that cannot conform with its rationale, but also the concerns. In this manner that which the paradigm excludes, Morin (1991: 217) notes, 'renders it blind', removing its reality and existence. Above all, a paradigm is invisible in that it is situated in the unconscious realm, a view shared by Jung, and plays in this manner a role in the conscious organization it controls. In consequence, whoever is subjected by a paradigm conforms to the reality the paradigm captures and describes, and at the same time it evokes a sentiment of reality.

With the above insights[82] it seems that the paradigmatic logic of a (management) descriptive system lies in its very kernel. In this way it is able to guide and determine the way experience is to be captured, logically and hyper-rationally.

19   Hyper-rational Logic

Lévi-Straus (2000/1978) has pointed out that 'to speak of rules and to speak of meaning is to speak of the same thing'. A (management) descriptive system as (management) myth-to-be is therefore rational with its own logic, rationale and purpose of existence, its own being. To develop this point, I first look at "*rationality*" and its modes with Weber and then at "*hyperrationality*" with Ritzer. Both rationality and hyperrationality as the qualities a (management) descriptive system has, are seen to be the means that

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[82] Despite the valuable insights that Morin provides us with, his argument seems to be over-deterministic in that he fails to account for the generation of paradigms. At a later point, Morin (1991: 231-238) claims that we are undergoing a paradigm change but does not mention how and why this should be so.

account for its outcomes in that they explain why such outcomes are achieved.

Starting with the former, for Weber (1978/1921: 24) action is 'instrumentally rational' (*zweckrational*) when it is 'determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings'. Such future-oriented projections become the conditions for a specific behavior and action to attain calculated ends. Further, action is for Weber (1978/1921: 24-25) 'value-rational' (*wertrational*) when it is 'determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic religious or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success'[83].

Excluding the presence of affectual and traditional motivations in instrumentally motivated action, Weber considers that values can play a role in determining the means for achieving (and establishing) ends. Surprisingly enough, seen from an instrumental viewpoint, Weber (1978/1921: 26) claims that value-rationality is 'always irrational'. This is because, 'the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself *(sic)* to this value for its own sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute goodness or devotion to duty, the less is he *(sic)* influenced by considerations of the consequences of his *(sic)* action' *(ibid.)*. Thus, the more ideal value becomes as the aim and exemplar to be followed, the more irrational (the less rational) the corresponding action is. If a (management) descriptive signature carries this value as it signifies and qualifies this value, the latter is the (management) descriptive meaning of a (management) descriptive system. Therefore, the stronger the relation between meanings and signatures, the stronger the power of a (management) descriptive system, the less do we become aware of the outcomes of this process, that is, the effect as realized purpose, to convince and entice. This is however not only puzzling, but also displays a strong tendency to equate irrationality with fallacy, contrasted to rationality equated with truth. Before going any further, I want to briefly examine whether this line of thought is well founded or not.

Equating irrationality with fallacy is perhaps most familiar with dreams, which are an exemplar of irrationality, of illusory and senseless experience that one can (and should) doubt in terms of their

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[83] Weber (1978/1921: 25) further qualifies action to be 'affectual', motivated by affects and feelings, and 'traditional', motivated by ingrained habituation.

truth content following Descartes (1960/1637: 72). To examine whether this assertion is valid, I (briefly) consider three aspects. Namely, the rationality of dream-generation, the rationality of dream-form, and the rationality of dream-content – the latter two being the effect of the former. Freud (1911: 2) has demonstrated that a 'dream will reveal itself as a psychological structure, full of significance'. Two results follow from this. On the one hand, dream is a phenomenon of complete validity, it is part of the chain of our mental acts. Thus regardless of the state, awake or asleep, the locus generating mental (management) descriptions is the same wherein processes of transforming sedimented materials of experience take place. These processes as a process are rational. Dream-generation as a process is therefore rational. On the other hand, it is a signifying process in that it produces meanings that are found in a form that we recognize. Dream-form is therefore rational. I still need to examine whether dream-content is rational or not. One can argue that it is not, since the very fact of falling asleep involves a renunciation of one of the psychic activities, namely, the voluntary guidance of the flow of ideas. Irrationality of the dream-content then may be explained by the restricted activity of the psyche during sleep, since 'it reconciles, without hesitation, the worst contradictions; it admits impossibilities; it disregards the authoritative knowledge of the waking state, and it shows us as ethically and morally obtuse' (Freud, 1911: 22). If this is the case, the question of rationality or irrationality in dream-content captured in a rational dream-form as a result of rational dream-generation amounts to intention and control over generating meanings with or without a content that is true.

It seems to me however, there are no sufficient grounds for sustaining the argument that under intention and control dream-content is true and therefore rational. If this is really the case, it amounts equating rationality with truth, which is familiar with mathematical relations. To take a trivial case, one can say, for example, that $2 + 2 = 5$. This is apparently an irrational action, a false conclusion for Bishop (1998: 69). And this is indeed the case so long as one stands within the mathematical cannons. It is, arguable, not the case when the intention is to connote the effect of power as Orwell (1954/1949: 198) claims for this specific relation. In this case the mathematical canon to respect the equality between the two sides of the relation is irrelevant: it is a question of who has the authority to

make a claim of truth even if this claim goes counter to what is (commonly) known to be valid and true. In this case, it is the (institutionalized) other as the center of power who decides. Conversely, if the mathematical canon *is* relevant in that the implied equality in the relation must be satisfied, this canon as the center of power is the authority for making a claim of truth. The constitution of such a center of power is however not a guarantee for the maintenance of the canon in terms of its ability to generate truth. Indeed, as Bishop (1998: 89) demonstrates that the equality $6 = 5$ can hold, paradoxically though due to its Aristotelian foundation in that it is based on 'all-or-nothing (i.e. integer) assumptions' made about an 'inherently fuzzy (i.e. non-integer) system'. Thus rationality and truth as such are independent since their degree of dependency arises from the foundation from where they are premised. To retrace the argument I made above, dream-content is not irrational. It is only different.

These arguments clearly undo Weber's argument that value-rationality is irrational in that dominance of values reduces the likelihood of instrumentally rational action. If the aim is attainment of a particular value, action must be instrumental so as to generate this value as meaning. It therefore happens for a reason as outcome that informs the manifestation of such actions. The reason is none other than to classify action for the purpose of justifying action according to the values that are attached to both action and its justification, which, is a (classified) action itself.

Classifying action is premised on constructing and using a (management) descriptive system, which involves two rationalities to use Weber (in Ritzer, 2001: 178-179). To start with, a 'theoretical rationality', which 'is the kind of rationalization the systematic thinker performs on the image of the world: an increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts'. It involves an attempt to transcend that haphazard world by providing logical explanations through the use of precise and abstract concepts. Further, a 'practical rationality' as 'the methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means'. It is to be found in the mundane world, which is accepted as such, wherein we seek to deal with difficulties in the most expedient way possible.

To apply these notions, theoretical rationality accounts for the construction of (management) descriptive systems whereas practical

rationality accounts for the use of (management) descriptive systems for a purpose, and the actions underlying the process for constructing (management) descriptive systems. Relative to the latter, if theoretical rationality is moved by the attempt to approximate the signified as a notion by constructing the signifier, practical rationality is moved by the attempt to approximate the manner in which the former approximation should take place[84].

It is worth noting that the distinction between theoretical and practical rationality is simply a matter of content, in that the former is concerned with "what" and the latter with "how". Both however share a common denominator, in that both use (management) descriptive systems to account for "what" and "how", respectively. This in turn means that since the (management) descriptive meanings are different, their (management) descriptive signatures must also be the different. It follows that if the signifiers and qualifiers are different, the values we attach to these particular ways of rationalizing must also be different - hence the generation of types.

It is matter of 'substantive rationality' for Weber (1978/1921: 85), which refers to 'the degree to which the provisioning of given groups of persons (no matter how delimited) with goods is shaped by oriented action under some criterion (past, present, or potential) of ultimate values'. This is regardless of the nature of these ends[85]. The fact is that values are rationally selected for a given end, which renders action rational in terms of value instrumentality. The question of selecting values is contrasted, and therefore related with the (institutionalized) other as the source for fixing values. It is a matter of 'formal rationality' for Weber (1978/1921: 85), which refers to 'the extent of quantitative calculation … which is technically possible and which is actually applied'. The best means to an end is chosen on the

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[84] It follows that if the end is to signify "myth", the former is moved by the attempt to approximate the notion of "myth", and the latter by the attempt to give an account of the manner the notion "myth" should be approximated. These are, respectively, the hermeneutic and heuristic tasks.

[85] Weber (1978/1921: 85-86) explains that substantive rationality applies to certain criteria of ultimate ends – regardless of the type, ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, or egalitarian, or whatever, and measures the results obtained against the values set. He also notes that there is an infinite number of possible value scales for this type of rationality, inclusive of 'criteria of status distinctions, or of the capacity for power, especially of the war capacity, of a political unit'. It is equally possible 'to judge from an ethical, ascetic, or aesthetic point of view' *(ibid.)*.

basis of (allegedly) agreed-upon rules, regulations, and laws. In this manner formal rationality denotes institutionalized action, which, by purpose and design, is conventional.

To use again these arguments, substantive rationality accounts for the choice of (management) descriptive signatures and therefore of (management) descriptive systems, whereas formal rationality for the dominance of some (management) descriptive systems, those being given the authority to do so. Put differently, the (management) descriptive signature of a (management) descriptive system denotes substantive rationality as it is made up of signifiers and qualifiers chosen relative to meaning, whereas formal rationality denotes a fixed-by-authority (management) descriptive system.

Indeed, the exemplary case of formal rationality is 'bureaucracy' (Weber, 1978/1921: 225), which is found in various settings[86] wherein the actions of people are determined by laws or administrative regulations rather than the values that determine action, as in substantive rationality. Similarly, Weber (1978/1921: 1186) describes the formal rationality of capitalism where 'matter-of-fact considerations, that are simply non-ethical, determine individual behavior'. Further, of modem law where issues of ultimate justice are ignored as the emphasis is placed on the application of 'definitely fixed legal concepts in the form of highly abstract rules' (Weber, 1978/1921: 277). The decision of legal problems is however 'influenced by norms different from those obtained through logical generalization of abstract interpretations of meaning' (Weber, 1978/1921: 645-657).

These points show that the common denominator stratifying social action is convention, which, with Brubaker (in Ritzer, 2001: 181), 'is embodied in the social structure and confronts individuals as something external to them'. With Weber (1978/1921: 1156) convention becomes a universal denominator, a 'universal phenomenon [that] more and more restricts the importance of charisma and of individually differentiated conduct' (Weber, 1978/1921: 1156). Its discursivity and therefore systems of rarefaction qualifying its discursive logic is duplicated. This is why Weber (1978/1921: 1000, my emphasis) argues that, 'bureaucracy strives

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[86] The capitalistic economy and its specific aspects as the money economy and double entry bookkeeping, the factory, and the law according to Weber (1978/1921: 106-107, 161-164, 656-657).

everywhere for the creation of a "right to the office", by the establishment of regular disciplinary procedures'[87]. It is worth noting that if convention is a universal phenomenon as a structure of action, it does not imply the existence of universal values. Convention, simply put, is not a value. It needs to be qualified in addition to being signified. Hence the role of substantive rationality.

In combining all six types of rationality it follows a particular constitution (theoretical rationality) of a fixed-by-authority (management) descriptive signature (formal rationality) to carry specific values (substantive rationality) relative to particular effects (practical rationality). In this manner the action of describing (instrumental rationality) becomes a function of values, of meanings and effects (value rationality). Such an action is linked with the functional, discursive and paradigmatic logics for the establishment of grounding.

In this manner the rationality types that Weber proposes are complementary relative to the outcomes in that each type signifies an aspect of the rational quality that a (management) descriptive system has. Instead of conflicts[88] we have a rapprochement.

In this respect Weber (in Ritzer, 2001: 221) highlights that in spite of the conflicts, theoretical and practical rationalities belong

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[87] It is worth noting that "disciplinary" here is not given the same sense as that given by Foucault. For Weber, "discipline" is a logical mode of organizing society involving a rational set of procedures, which is not found in any particular area of knowledge; quite the contrary: It is a feature found in all areas of knowledge production, in society overall. For Foucault, however, "discipline" refers to a specified area of knowledge, which is delineated as a result of the application of a set of procedures. In brief, for the former "discipline" is a means, for the latter a result.

[88] Weber (1978/1921: 451) remarks 'the conflict between empirical reality and [the] conception of the world as a meaningful totality'. Practical rationality comes into conflict with the broader orientation of substantive rationality; which can also come into conflict with theoretical rationality. The commonality of practical rationality disagrees with the abstraction of theoretical rationality. The creativity involved in practical rationality comes into conflict with the rule-governed character of formal rationality: the abstract search by people for making sense of the world around them in theoretical rationality is stifled by the rules and regulations of formally rational systems. Finally, there is the conflict between substantive rationality and formal rationality in law for example, where Weber (1978/1921: 220-1) contends that substantive justice conflicts with the 'formalism and the rule bound and cool "matter-of-factness" of bureaucratic administration'.

inseparably together, in that the use of abstract ideas can help effect the methodical attainment of a practical aim by way of precise and calculative means. Further, the linkage between substantive and practical rationality, in that 'to the extent that an inner-worldly religion of salvation is determined by distinctly ascetical tendencies, it always demands a practical rationalism, in the sense of the maximization of rational action as such' (Weber, 1978/1921: 220-1). Furthermore, on theoretical and substantive rationality Weber (1978/1921: 500) argues that 'the destiny of religions has been influenced in a most comprehensive way by intellectualism and its various relationships to the priesthood and political authorities'. Further still, Weber (1978/1921: 656) implies a linkage between theoretical and formal rationality when stating that lawmaking is formally irrational when one applies means which cannot be controlled by the intellect. Finally and most remarkably formal and substantive rationalities coexist in that 'in many (and under certain very artificial assumptions even in all) cases they may coincide empirically' (Weber, 1978/1921: 108). This can happen when substantive values exist within formally rational structures where there is the 'provision of a certain minimum of subsistence for the maximum size of the population' *(ibid.)*. When this occurs, 'formal and substantive rationality coincide to a relative high degree' (Weber, 1978/1921: 109).

The coexistence of rationality types is nevertheless limited. It is by extending such limitations on coexistence that Ritzer (2001: 218) introduces the notion of 'hyperrationality', especially with the aim to undermine the bias in Weber's work towards formal rationality and its inevitable triumph over the other types.

To use Ritzer then, a (management) descriptive system being rationally constructed in practice and in theory, as practice informed by theory itself generated by practice - therefore with rules and values, is to start with, efficient. It is not only constructed with the optimum method for getting from one point to another, it further seeks to describe the optimum method for getting from one point to another, for achieving one's aims, whether these are trivial or sacred[89]. Further,

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[89] Ritzer (2001: 198), in discussing the McDonaldisation of society, highlights that institutions offer the best available way to satisfying one's needs, notably McDonald's, which offer efficiency in, for instance, losing weight, lubricating cars, getting new glasses or contacts, or completing income-tax forms. Is this not the utilitarian purpose of the Web?

a (management) descriptive system attempts to translate value rationality into formal rationality thereby putting an accent on quantity and measurement, while at the same time it provides value to measure discourses. With respect to the latter, Ritzer (2001: 199) points out that quantity has become equivalent to quality in that 'a lot of something, or the quick delivery of it, means it must be good'[90], and remarks that 'calculability' has become an important discourse of our society. Indeed, it is a feature that not only is to be found in the way organizations are run but also how individuals are concerned with saving time[91].

A (management) descriptive system is further concerned with its replicability, its predictability as *re*-assurance that its content and values will be the same over time and in all locales. The underlying rationale is surprise aversion[92]. Replicability – thus repetition, is achieved by laying out 'scripts' (Ritzer, 2001: 200), formally rational procedures that are to be followed to ensure that efficiency is attained. Next to this there is control, the assurance that the ideals the (management) descriptive system carries and describes will be attained. Ritzer (2001: 200) notes that people control a human technology, whereas a non-human technology controls people.

From the above discussion it seems clear that a (management) descriptive system as (management) myth-to-be is hyper-rational as it involves the simultaneous dynamic co-existence of different (non-exhaustive) types of rationalities. This means that such a (management) descriptive system seeks to keep all rationality types in a poised dynamic that balances out the differences in their inter-relationship. It is a synergism allowing not only for the emergence of an extraordinarily high level of rationality, but also for the capability of stability in the turbulence of events.

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[90] Ritzer (2001: 199) illustrates this discourse by observing that 'people order the Quarter Pounder, the Big Mac, the large fries. More recently, there is the lure of the "double this" (for instance, Burger King's 'Double Whopper with Cheese') and the "triple that"'.

[91] A notable example of time saving given by Ritzer (2001: 199) is Lens Crafters, which promises people 'Glasses fast, glasses in one hour.'

[92] Ritzer (2001: 199) illustrates this with the Egg McMuffin, which will be identical in Chicago and Los Angeles, not to mention that those eaten next week or next year will be identical to those eaten today.

IV

20   (Management) myth

This study has been an attempt to conceptualize "myth" from the establishment of the outcomes of a description as realized purposes, in addition to the establishment of the set of logics organizing a (management) description relative to the purposes as outcomes. Having identified and discussed the conditions for the existence of a descriptive system as myth-to-be, I am now in a position to conceptualize "myth", generally and specifically in management.

Therefore, I offer the following general definition: "*Myth*" is a logical descriptive system with particular outcomes. By extension, (management) myth is a logical (management) descriptive system with particular outcomes (observable in management). It follows that (management) myth seeks to convince and entice (organizational members) by means of the set of logics that are signified by the (management) descriptive signature of (management) myth.

A number of interesting results follow from this. We can expect that a different (management) descriptive signature to generate a different (management) myth through these logics. This implies that the logics are common to all (management) myth regardless of the (management) descriptive signature. If this is the case, the purpose for constructing and using (management) myth, that which we want the (management) myth to do, or that which the (management) myth does, the outcomes, must be the same. Put simply, although (management) myths may be different as they use different (management) descriptive signatures, the outcomes are the same. The outcomes are the same because the logics are the same – but the (management) myths are different. It follows that (management) myth is a logical (management) descriptive system with similar outcomes. Thus the purpose of (management) myth is to convince and entice for its survival and such a purpose appears to be the common feature of all (management) myth, although the (management) descriptive meanings that each (management) myth signifies may be different. (Management) myth as a logical (management) descriptive system is

therefore different from a (management) descriptive system. Generally speaking, "myth" is different from "description"

In what follows then I propose to highlight some differences between these two notions. Then give some indications as per the functions of (management) myth given its logics and outcomes, and conclude the study by offering an argument in favor of (management) myth as a logical (management) description of (management) experience and not a fable.

21 Structure in (management) myth

The previous insights show that "myth" and "description" are intimately related in that (management) myth cannot live without (management) description: (management) description is not only the vehicle for (management) myth, but also (management) myth is able to convey meaning only through (management) description. Unlike Cassirer (1953/1946: 11, 32, 56-57) for whom description[93] and myth are separate as they serve different spiritual functions, the first being universalistic the second particularistic, a difference attributed to form, for Gould (1981: 29) description and myth are not separate because 'all signs are transformational events'. The mythicity of myth is related to the mythicity of description. If this is the case I suggest that mythicity then *is* the common denominator[94] of both "myth" and "description" in that it signifies their purpose and existence, that is, to speak on behalf of another.

If the purpose is the same, their form must be different. Such a difference I suggest is due to the ability (management) myth has to disclose experience as 'a second-degree function of the primary symbols' in use (Ricoeur: 1969/1967: 18), as it possesses specific connotations in addition to its conventional and obvious meaning, according to Jung (1964: 20).

This argument follows that proposed by Barthes (1993/1957: 117) to distinguish between, on the one hand, the first-order semiological system, wherein the signifier is referred to as 'meaning', and the signified as 'concept', united in a 'sign'. On the other, a

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[93] To be more precise, Cassirer contrasts language and myth.

[94] Cassirer proposes to find this through a method of regress, that is, go back in time at the point when language and myth were not divergent.

second-order semiological system wherein the signifier is referred to as 'form' and the signified as 'concept', united in 'signification' *(ibid.)*.

With this distinction in mind, "description" is akin to a first-order semiological (descriptive) system whereas "myth" is a second-order semiological (descriptive) system. With (management) myth, 'that which is a sign (namely the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second' (Barthes, 1993/1957: 114). (Management) myth then as a logical (management) descriptive system signifies an additional dimension compared to a (management) descriptive system. It signifies the logics and outcomes.

Barthes (1985: 77) further highlights that under the case of the 'connotative semiotic' propounded by Hjelmslev (1961: 103) the second-order semiological system consists in the 'connotative plane', whereas the first-order semiological system consists in the 'denotative plane', a distinction also used by Campbell (*The Message of the Myth*, 1988b). To use Hjelmslev (1961: 119) "description" *de-notes* whereas "myth" not only de-notes, but also *co-notes* – hence a dual meaning. The issue at this point is to identify what is that (management) myth co-notes.

Barthes (1985: 78-79) observes the difference between 'connotation' and 'metalanguage' based on Hjelmslev (1961: 119). Specifically, with the connotative semiotic the signs of the first-order semiological system constitute the *signifiers* of the second-order semiological system. With the metalinguistic semiotic it is the obverse: the signs of the first-order semiological system constitute the *signifieds* of the second-order semiological system. If (management) myth is metalanguage, that which a (management) descriptive system is not, it is for Barthes (1993/1957: 114, original emphasis) a 'second language *in which* one speaks about the [the language-object]'. Put simply, it is a (management) description that speaks of itself.

To use the previous insights I suggest two lines of thought. First, (management) myth de-notes. As a first-order semiological system, as (management) descriptive system it has a (management) descriptive signature that signifies experience as (management) descriptive meaning. (Management) myth therefore is not different from any (management) descriptive system. Second, (management) myth co-notes. It does so by using a (management) descriptive system for two

purposes. On the one hand, to signify the logics and outcomes, and on the other, to signify its own (management) descriptive system. Put simply, the content of (management) myth (as form) is not only experience but also the (management) descriptive system that constitutes (management) myth whose presence is explained by the function such a system aims to achieve.

22   Metasemiosis

Given the difference between the connotative and the metalinguistic semiotic, Hjelmslev (1961: 119) prefers the term 'metasemiosis' as it refers to an operation that can be applied in each situation regardless of its content. Thus, to express a state of such plural reference I want to offer the following general definition: "*Metasemiotic*" refers to decided significations to describe any form of experience and its description from without regardless of their content. By extension, (management) metasemiotic refers to decided significations to describe any form of (management) experience and its (management) description from without regardless of their content.

Put simply, (management) myth as a (management) metasemiotic refers not only to (management) experience, that which is lived and perceived (inclusive of its description), but also to (management) myth itself, that which is lived and described (inclusive of its perception). It produces an awareness of a dual content and its effects, in addition to what exactly the (management) descriptive signature signifies. (Management) myth therefore, enables us to step outside a (management) descriptive system and adopt a "meta" position, unlike Deleuze (1994/1968: 26) for whom 'a dynamic space must be defined from a point of view of an observer tied to that space, not from an external position'. However, it seems to me that is precisely the metasemiotic quality of (management) myth that enables us to describe experience, that is, present and re-present experience, in addition to experiencing presentations and re-presentations and re-presenting these.

This seems to be the function of arts and especially the visual arts if one follows Campbell (*The First Storytellers*, 1988c) in that they are able to create myths, or better, to generate myths[95] to look

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[95] Elitist mythology and the 'myth of the damned artist' (Eliade, 1963: 229).

upon themselves while depicting both shared and personal concerns. The reason, Campbell (*The Message of the Myth*, 1988b) notes, lies in the function of myth to connote a transcendent dimension, hence is akin to poetic language. Bultmann (1953: 6) offers a similar idea when stating that 'the real purpose of myth is to speak of a transcendent power which controls the world and man, but that purpose is impeded and obscured by the terms in which it is expressed'. For Campbell myth is neither opaque nor ambiguous: it communicates a content that goes *beyond* our daily concerns[96].

(Management) myth in this manner goes further than (management) description. It is manifested by all 'purports' to transpose from Hjelmslev (1961: 50), and thought itself. It refers to more than what is linguistically captured, since with Hester (in Ricoeur, 1975: 290) it becomes "seeing as". With Hatab (1990: 20-21, 25), drawing on Heidegger, (management) myth as a narrative presents elements that 'express the entire range of experiences relating to these elements, a lived world where the fate of human beings situated-in-the-world counts as "reality"'.

(Management) myth therefore is more than a translation of (management) experience. It is the transmutation of an experience into a medium that is foreign to experience, an 'alien' ($\alpha\lambda\lambda o\tau\rho\iota o\varsigma$) to use Aristotle (*Poetics*, 1457b 30). As an alien, an exterior, (management) myth sets "description" and "experience" in a dialectical

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[96] The example Campbell (*The Hero's Adventure*, 1988a) uses is that of "Starwars". Taking the same view, Beuret (1999: 37-38) shows that the appeal (and success) of the trilogy and moreover that of "Episode I" and "Episode II" is due to the constant reference to myth and mythic heroes. The point is that not only do we find references to Medieval, Nordic, Greek myths and figures with elements of the new age, that is, animist and esoteric, but also a context that is hyper-real, an observation that Campbell also makes (*The Hero's Adventure*, 1988a). In this manner '"Starwars" blends a world that is ultra-technological, incomprehensible, and a world made of values which are fundamentally human' (*humaines*) according to Beuret (1999: 37). The same observation can be made for other similar movies such as 'The Matrix', "Stargate" or the "Lord of the Rings". Concerning the latter, in an interview given by Pearce (*Lay Witness*, September 2001) on Tolkien's philosophy of myth it is pointed out that the principle underlying such works is the maxim "not facts first, truth first". There is therefore a differentiation between facts, which are purely physical, and truth, which is metaphysical. Thus 'a myth or a fairy story can convey love and hate, selfishness and self-sacrifice, loyalty and betrayal, good and evil—all of which are metaphysical realities, that is, true, even if conveyed in a mythological or fairyland setting'.

relationship[97]. It is not a temporal relationship[98], but a relation at a distance to use Ricoeur (1975: 26-27, 239) in two senses. In a negative sense, because estranged. In a positive sense, because borrowed, relative to the point of origin. If the point of origin in this relationship is experience, to further use Ricoeur (1975: 24, 31), (management) myth signifies movement, a 'displacement' of information, of meaning effected by a linguistic displacement from (management) description to itself. Thus, transmutation of experience is not simply the 'transition to another category, but actually the creation of the category itself' to use Cassirer (1953/1946: 87). That is, the creation of "myth" itself (to signify itself, a (management) descriptive system and experience).

With the above insights it seems that the metasemiotic quality of (management) "myth" that sets it apart from (management) "description" while being a (management) descriptive system, 'puts into … form reason and passion as two necessarily related aspects of lived experiences' (Anderson, 2002: 101). And to achieve this, (management) myth uses signs. And it is the way one defines such signs (as per the functional logic) and how one uses such signs to

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[97] Deleuze (1994/1968: 60-61) explains that Plato establishes the difference between truth and falsity thanks to the method of division which involves the use of myth. In the 'Statesman' for instance there is the use of the image of an ancient God as the shepherd-King and in the 'Phaedrus' there is the description of the circulation of souls before their incarnation. In other words, in the absence of any mediation because such a division lacks probative force difference has to be relayed by a myth to provide an imaginary equivalent of mediation. But such a conceptualisation of division according to Deleuze (1994/1968: 62) demands a foundation that is on the one hand capable of making the difference while on the other to exist as a state of difference whereupon it can be grounded; this is a difficulty to be overcome. As Deleuze (1994/1968: 66-67) puts it: ' the whole of Platonism, …, is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction between 'the thing itself' and the simulacra. Difference is not thought in itself but related to a ground, subordinated to the same and subject to mediation in mythic form. Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections. … .When eternal return is the power of (formless) Being, the simulacrum is the true character or form - the 'being'- of that which is'.

[98] In contrast, Cassirer (1953/1946: 88) sees that "myth" and "description" – "language" to be more precise, 'are two diverse shoots from the same parent stem, the same impulse of symbolic formulation, springing from the same basic mental activity, a concentration and heightening of simple sensory experience. …: they are both resolutions of an inner tension, the representation of subjective impulses and excitations in definite objective forms and figures'.

construct series of meanings into discourses (as per the discursive logic), that informs the construction of a particular view of (management) experience, to describe and thus carry experience. Any (management) myth, in other words, is unique and bears a signature that helps it to be differentiated from another (management) myth. To use Fiedler (1960: 317) such uniqueness is based on the (management) descriptive signature of (management) myth as 'the sum total of individuating factors'. It is 'the sign of the Persona or Personality through which [(management) myth] is rendered, and which itself tends to become a subject as well as a means of [(management) myth]' *(ibid.)*[99].

23   Symbolism

With (management) myth a symbolism persists that is common to *all* the elements (and their properties) composing our environment. They become signifying and meaningful through myth to use Eliade (1963: 178) because as Ricoeur (1969/1967: 9, original emphasis) notes, '*the most primitive and least mythical language is already a symbolic language'.* That is, (management) myth has *not* lost its exploratory significance and its role for revealing the relationship between the sacred, the ideal, and us. It has persisted over time.

(Management) myth endures because of symbolic language, which, being itself a hermeneutics, is indirect and imaginary, metasemiotic, in that knowledge moves to (management) myth and from (management) myth to the primary symbolic expressions at play. In this way, (management) myth has a symbolic function, in three dimensions, namely, cosmic, oneiric and poetic.

As far as the cosmic dimension is concerned, 'symbolism … refers back to manifestations of the sacred, to hierophanies, where the sacred is shown in a fragment of the cosmos' (Ricoeur, 1969/1967: 10). At the same, cosmic symbolism 'gets charged with innumerable meanings, integrates and unifies the greatest possible number of the sectors of anthropocosmic experience', resulting into a 'matrix of symbolic meanings as words' *(ibid.).* In other words, there is identification between the symbolic manifestation and signification,

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[99] Note that here [(management) myth] substitutes "archetype" in the first instance, and "poem" in the second, on grounds that Fielder (1960: 316) prefers "myth" to "archetype".

progressively away from the cosmic grounding[100], but retaining its cosmic roots.

In terms of the oneiric dimension, Ricoeur (1969/1967: 12) claims, drawing on Freud and Jung, that the sacred is not only manifested on the cosmos but also, identically, on the psyche of oneself. The role of symbolism in (management) myths is to act as guide for identity construction with the aim of unification with the cosmic aspect of the (management) myth. Ricoeur (1969/1967: 13) makes this point explicit: 'I express myself in expressing the world; I explore my own sacrality in deciphering that of the word'.

Yet the cosmic and oneiric dimensions need an image-representation for making present that which the (management) myth conveys, and hence the importance of the 'poetic dimension' *(ibid.)*.

If (management) myth has a symbolic function in three dimensions it is because symbols consist of signs, as expressions that communicate meaning, since, as metasemiotics, they have a double intentionality in that they 'aim at something beyond themselves and stand for that something' (Ricoeur, 1969/1967: 15). There is therefore a literal and symbolic meaning, a feature that gives them depth, which is 'inexhaustible' *(ibid.)*. Ricoeur makes this argument on exploring the concept of analogy, that between the literal and symbolic meanings of symbols, in that there is according to Blondel (in Ricoeur, 1969/1967: 15) 'an interior stimulation', an 'assimilative solicitation'. At the same time Ricoeur (1969/1967: 16) makes the difference between allegory and symbol and claims that a symbol presents its meaning not through translation but as an enigma[101]. Ricoeur arrives at this conclusion by drawing on Pepin, and arguably on Jung, in that the literal meaning of an allegory – primary signification - is contingent, whereas the symbolic meaning – secondary signification – is specific, hence a translatability of one into

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[100] Ricoeur claims that there is a movement from the symbolism of defilement to the symbolism of sin and then to that of guilt (Ricoeur, 1969/1967: 11-12) within the myth of the original sin or, as Lacarriere (1984: 145) has called it an 'error of creation'.

[101] In a similar fashion Pearce (*Lay Witness*, September 2001), speaking on Tolkien's philosophy of myth, explains that 'in an allegory, the writer begins with the point he wishes to make and then makes up a story to make his point. The story is really little more than a means of illustrating the moral. Tolkien believed that a myth should not be allegorical but that it should be "applicable". In other words, 'the truth that emerges in the story can be applied to the truth that emerges in life'.

the other. Such a dialectic relationship underpins the metasemiotic quality of (management) myth.

For Fromm (1953/1951: 10-11) symbolism is qualified by a rationale that does not resemble ordinary logic, since the language in use obeys "time" and "space", to a logic where the fundamental concepts are "intensity" and "association"; it does however have its proper grammar and syntax. Moreover, it does not resemble neither formal logic nor transcendental logic for Ricoeur (1969/1967: 17) since it is limited to a priori cognition alone if one follows Kant (1998/1781 & 1787: 267, 269), because the former is bound to its content whereas the latter is not. It follows that for Ricoeur (1969/1967: 18-19) symbolism is a function of myth, 'myths [are] a species of symbols' since 'myth is … logos'[102] in that without language, the experience described through (management) myth would be mute and obscure. (Management) myths in this sense can be seen as '*organs* of reality' to use Cassirer (1953/1946: 8, original emphasis), in that they enable the constitution of reality since they are reality itself[103]. As a true narrative (management) myth always refers to realities, or as Malinowski (1933: 8) has put it, to the 'lived reality' (*realité vécue*).

Thus, what underlies (management) myth and its narrative is an undivided consciousness in relating oneself affectively and practically with the experience the (management) myth purports to describe, and in particular 'the whole of things' (Ricoeur, 1969/1967: 166). (Management) myth in this way enables more than the constitution of reality: it transports us in realms that are found beyond reality.

24   Expressing human concerns

For this reason Campbell (1986: 55, original emphasis) claims that myth enables the physical realm to become '*meta*physically grounded in a dreamlike mythological realm beyond space and time, which, since it is physically invisible, can be known only to the mind'. Thus (management) myth bears at the same time psychological and

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[102] In a certain way symbols precede (management) myths: this is not only an observation for Ricoeur but also a method for approaching and explaining (management) myth.

[103] Whether (management) myth as a reality is able to perfectly transcribe reality is another matter; it is a question of difference and repetition.

metaphysical connotations, in that psychological significant features of a social order are transformed through myth into 'transcendental transparencies' (Campbell, 1986: 56). Stated simply, such a transmutation is the common denominator of human concerns as it causes such concerns to become metaphysical and ideal through (management) myth. It is this denominator I now want to highlight.

Campbell (*The Hero's Adventure*, 1988a) states that myth and the transcendental realm are related in that myth 'expresses what cannot be known or found … it is the edge between what can be known and cannot be discovered because it is a mystery transcendent of all research'. Unlike Schilbrack (2002: 90), who has argued against the claim for the existence of noumenal realities beyond thought, with Campbell (management) myth brings us to a level of consciousness, which is spiritual, and has material and bodily effects as it transforms consciousness.

(Management) myth therefore transcends (organizational) life and its pragmatic content in a dual relationship, wherein the terms perfectly resemble one the other, but not the elements composing it. Campbell (1986: 56), drawing on Kant, explains this dual relationship. Specifically, given the elements a, b, c, and x, that latter being absolutely unknown and unknowable, there can be a perfect resemblance of the relationships of a to b, and c to x, even if the elements a, b, c, and x are dissimilar. With respect to (management) myth, the transcendental relationship of an unknown and unknowable cause (x) is, in respect to the world (c), what human reason (b) is in respect to the work of human art (a). Stated differently, Campbell draws a parallel between processes of reason and processes of (management) myth creation wherein (management) mythical thinking plays the part of conceptual thinking to use Lévi-Straus (2000/1978: 17-18). Campbell (1986: 57-58) further notes that one *cannot* assume perfect similarity in this dual relationship and consider it to be an absolute similarity, given that in the two strands of the relationship the first term is seen as a cause and the second as effect. Campbell *(ibid.)* therefore concludes that all can be said has to be in the way of an "as if", philosophically and theologically through the analogy of a rational causation, and mythologically 'in the way of a psychologically affective image [that is] transparent to transcendence'.

The parallel between processes of reason and processes of (management) myth creation that give (management) myth its

transcendental quality effects a link between the *meta*-physical and the *meta*-semiotic. The metaphysical is grounded in the metasemiotic. The metasemiotic transcends (organizational) life and its pragmatic content. It is idealized (while its outcomes are realized).

In this manner, (management) myth transcends (organizational) concerns as expressions of human wonder in that a 'sacred story' is recounted to use Eliade (1963: 16). For Hatab (1990: 19, original emphasis) myth '*is a narrative which discloses a sacred world'*. (Management) myth is sacred as it recounts a purified and idealized (organizational) world. With Doty (2002: 146) (management) myth deals with abstract (organizational) concerns in its endeavor to render them 'concrete' via 'a symbolic language useful for designating meanings within the everyday that are initially discerned in the realms of particularly heightened experiences'.

At the same time, (management) myth indicates how something was created or produced and started *being* (*être*). It recounts what really happened, what was actually manifested according to Eliade (1963: 17). (Management) myth makes references to the past, to a primordial time. This time is characterized by a state of bliss which precedes that of the fissure, the moment when time is merely 'lived time' (1963: 101-102). This is also highlighted by Campbell (*Sacrifice and Bliss*, 1988d) when stating that we need to 'follow our bliss'. Given its importance, Eliade (1963: 114-115) shows that original bliss[104] can be recovered either through psychoanalysis, drawing on Freud, or through rituals. Both ways are seen as an endeavor[105] to either reintegrate the individual into the original state, or to progressively take the individual back in time through the remembrance of personae and essential events, through cultural recollection.

Either way, it is *in* the presence of (management) myth that we reintegrate the time of origin as point of departure for being. We therefore become contemporaneous of the recounted events. In living (management) myth we exit chronological time to enter the sacred

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[104] Questin (2001 : 27) moreover points out that, in addition to mythology, Tolkien is also concerned with nostalgia, the yearning of the lost world.

[105] For Ricoeur (1969/1967: 5, original emphasis) such an attempt is impossible because 'a (management) myth is *only* a (management) myth because we can no longer connect that time with the time of history as we write it … nor can we connect (management) mythical places with our geographical space.'

time which is 'primordial' (Eliade, 1963: 32-33). If this is the event that Deleuze (1994/1968: 67, original emphasis) signifies as 'eternal return', it is that which 'makes us party to a universal *ungrounding*, that is, 'the freedom of the non-mediated ground, the discovery of a ground behind every other ground …'. In this event then lies the transformation of human concerns[106] as it signifies the passage into the metaphysical realm that a (management) myth marks by giving to each concern an existential value (and thus existence), thereby becoming the expression of the common denominator of human concerns.

25   Expressing human psyche

With Campbell (1986: 55, original emphasis) the metaphysical quality of (management) myth is related to the fundamental structures of our psyche in that (management) myth 'is *psychologically* symbolic'. This argument takes us to Jung (in Segal, 1998: 3) who considers that 'myths are original revelations of the preconscious psyche, involuntary statements about unconscious psychic happenings, and anything but allegories of physical processes'. Stated simply, (management) myth is a superior form of expression of an unconscious common denominator of our psyche. It is this denominator I now want to highlight.

With Jung (1998/1960: 50) (management) myth signifies a process that does not take place in the world but in the mind since 'myths never were and never are made consciously, they arise from man's *(sic)* unconscious'. (Management) myth cannot be causally explained but needs to be understood teleo-logically as being the attempt by the unconscious to develop consciousness. As Segal (1998: 4) explains, Jung does not deny the parallel between the two, but denies that the former accounts for the latter. Thus, experiencing life is for Jung different from experiencing the (management) description, the (management) myth of (organizational) life. This is because the former provides the occasion, and not the cause, for the construction and therefore the manifestation of the latter in archetypes, as the unconscious common denominator of our psyche.

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[106] Regardless of the type inclusive of scientific concerns with, for instance, the origin of the universe - the "big bang", or that of languages, or of life to highlight the most important.

Stated differently, the underlying and enduring feature of culturally transmitted elements are archetypes, which is an explanation for enticing self and other in unity. For Frye (1957: 107) this is so because archetypes enable the identification of ritual and dream, since an archetype is primarily a communicable symbol. Gould (1981: 19) however notes that such a view assumes that archetypes and myths share the same 'mystique' as 'symbol-making processes'. For Gould (1981: 21) archetypes emerge arbitrarily, despite Jung's insistence of the contrary, because the dialectic and transformational relation between the unconscious and the archetype is *not* a priori dependent on the collective unconscious. For Jung (1968: 4) however the underlying and enduring feature of culturally transmitted elements *are* archetypes. This is because cultures (and organizations) are about and of people, who, in experiencing (management) myth, re-establish the connection between the conscious and the unconscious. This is however conditional. The connection between the conscious and the unconscious occurs *only* in so far as we are capable of demonstrating the contents of the latter.

For Jung *(ibid.)*, demonstrating the contents of the unconscious amounts to demonstrating the existence of archetypes by making the following reasoning: since archetypes are supposed to produce certain psychic forms, the question is to find a psychic domain wherein one can encounter their manifestation. This domain is that of dreams, since they are the products of the unconscious, sequences of fantasies produced by deliberate concentration, especially those produced during early childhood and in trance-states.

This is because for Jung (1964: 21), as it is for Campbell (1986: 55) and Fromm (1953/1951: 9-10), the manner of thinking in (management) myth and in dreams is equivalent. Both, in their idealized form, are productions of human imagination, in that they are revelations of the deepest hopes, desire, fears, potentialities and conflicts, of the human psyche. There is therefore a parallel between the symbolic content of dream and that of (management) myth.

They display a difference though. For Campbell (1986: 55) the difference lies in metaphysical reference in that latter are addressed in a manner that dreams normally are not relative to 'questions of the origins'. For Jung (in Segal, 1998: 23) their difference lies in rationality and emotional strength. In the case of (management) myth there is 'an ordered and most of the part immediately understandable

context. In the case of dreams there is a 'generally unintelligible, irrational, not to say delirious sequence of images which nonetheless does not lack a certain hidden coherence' (*ibid.*). Dreams, moreover, are packed with 'psychic energy' (Jung, 1964: 49) that (management) myth and our everyday life lack. Segal (1998: 23) notes that for Jung (management) myth is closer to the unconscious than dreams are since the latter can be archetypally identified by their symbolic content.

It is this intimate relation that gives (management) myth its superior form. Jung (in Segal, 1998: 18) makes this point explicit by stating that the 'protean mythologem and the shimmering symbol express the process of the psyche far more trenchantly and, in the end, far more clearly that the clearest concept'. He further claims that 'myth is the primordial language natural to … psychic processes, and no intellectual formulation comes anywhere near the richness and expressiveness of mythical imagery' (in Segal, 1998: 10). At the same time Jung (in Segal, 1998: 8) states that 'material brought forward – folkloristic, mythological, or historical – serves in the first place to demonstrate the uniformity of psychic events in time and space'.

Thus far it seems that with Jung (management) myth is the superior form of expression in terms of its composition and imagery to articulate the collective unconscious of a culture as the common denominator of our collective psyche[107]. The presence of archetypes explains the uncanny similarities of (management) myths. This is 'independent invention' resulting from recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions, the archetypes, common to the psyche according to Jung (1998/1981: 77). With Jung (1998/1978: 64) mythologems are *not* connected with a tradition (or a discipline). They can appear anywhere. They are independent from tradition (and of discipline).

If this is the case, 'commonality of archetypes' (Campbell, *Masks of Eternity*, 1988f) can explain the commonality found in all forms of expression independently from their time reference and historical context. Thus archetypes are not only found in traditional expressions of psychic and human concerns in general; they are to be

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[107] Malinowski (1933: 8) has been critical of such an approach in that it considers (management) myth to be nothing more than 'the day dream of a race' (*rêve diurne de la race*), thereby removing nature, history and culture to descend in the subconscious realm. Malinowski (1933: 8) adds that 'when the anthropologist and folklorist presents himself to the feast, finds nothing more than crumbs to look at'.

found in *all* contemporary forms of expression[108]. The last word can be given to Jaffé (1964: 232) who aptly summarizes this view by stating that art is the 'symbolic expression of the psychological condition of the modern word'. Such a psychological condition is captured in (management) myth as the expression of the common denominator of our psyche.

26   Expressing human society

If for Jung, Campbell and Eliade the common denominator of the collective unconscious that is expressed in (management) myth is the archetype, implying the presence of a common denominator in (organizational) societies, the common denominator may be different. Stated differently, different (organizational) societies may display a common denominator expressed in (management) myth whose origin is different from that of the archetypes. To such denominators I now turn.

To start with, such a common denominator may simply be the presence of a logical structure in (management) myth. To be more precise, the presence of a set of logics, those that give (management) myth its metasemiotic quality. This is because for Lévi-Strauss (1974/1958: 237-238) independent invention stands in opposition to the contingent character of the content of (management) myth, to the arbitrary feature of signs, considering that 'myth forms an integral part of language'. For this reason Lévi-Strauss (1974/1958: 241-243)

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[108] With Campbell (*The Hero's Adventure*, 1988a) all movies, and contemporary works of art in general, whether they make explicit reference to myths or not, have a common feature. Not only are they composed of similar mythical motives but also influence our identities as they present us with figures we can identify with. The (archetypal) universality of concerns is for Hanson and Kay (2001: 26) not only what has made "Star Wars" appealing but also what has transformed this saga into myth. Hanson and Kay (2001: 284-351) highlight themed pairs that include destiny vs. free will, and technology vs. organic life. Further, themes regarding family feuds and generation gaps, government, law, the Jedi as a religious group, music as a contributing factor, the force as a new religion, and the cult of "Star Wars" with its proliferation as a myth whereupon other myths are constructed to constitute an 'expanded universe'. Eliade (1963: 226-235) notes the same by describing the mythical components of mass media, especially of comic strips, the modern equivalent of mythological and folk heroes. Although the mythic reference in comic strips is explicit, Eliade *(ibid.)* points out that novels also make use of myths, or archetypes, referring to the compulsion for success, to 'transcend the limits of human condition'.

proposes a structural analysis of myth aiming at ordering the different types of myth and its variations. Although Lévi-Strauss (1974/1958: 259) does not seem to explain the consequences of his method, he does recognize that it is a 'universal mode for organizing the data of sense-experience'. He therefore seems to consider that (management) myth is logically structured (otherwise his method could be put into application). This is a 'demanding' logic (Lévi-Strauss, 1974/1958: 264). Therefore, logical structure, since its language dependent, *is* the common denominator in (management) myth across (organizational) societies and cultures.

A second possibility is the presence of ritual as an attempt to reintegrate the self and other into the original state, or to progressively take them back in time. Ritual amounts to re-actualizing (management) myth when communicated. In this way it organizes our conduct in our environment for Eliade (1963: 27). Jung, according to Segal (1998: 21) has also highlighted this point, moreover Campbell (*Love and the Goddess,* 1988e). Geertz (1993/1973: 48) considers myth to be as one of the 'significant systems' in addition to language, and art 'for orientation, communication, and self control'. This point is well summarized by Malinowski (1933: 45) when stating that a myth serves as a 'retrospective model' (*modèle rétrospectif*) 'of moral values of a sociological order'. (Management) myth in this way plays a social role to be played by all social (and therefore organizational) actors to use Schilbrack (2002: 1). Segal (1999: 44) points out that Eliade stresses the ritualistic enactment of (management) myth, as does Malinowski (1993: 9), in that when enacted, (management) myth serves as a 'time machine' since it recounts the first time (in the absence of factual origin) as an idealized time. Unlike de Mooij (1998: 46) who claims that rituals are 'carried out for their own sake', hence removed from (management) myth all together, they have for Eliade (1963: 175) an apodictic value as they enable us to experience the transcendent level of (management) myth. Unlike Lévi-Strauss (1974/1958: 266) who claims that a homology between (management) myth and ritual is the exception rather than the rule, for Campbell (1986: 56) rituals are 'direct expositions of their life-sustaining patterns', that is, of (management) myths. For Jung (in Segal, 1998: 18) 'the symbol not only conveys a visualization of the process but … it also brings a re-experiencing of it'. James (1958: 284) seems to agree with this view when stating that 'myths and ritual function to

promote social intercourse and security and to maintain the established tradition as a living reality within the milieu of primeval tradition as a consolidating dynamic'. Therefore ritual *is* the common denominator in (management) myth across (organizational) societies and cultures.

A third possibility is communication and exchange. Wood (1992: 9) explains independent invention by claiming that the 'common markers [of civilizations] are virtually universal, regardless of the differential conceptions of "civilization"'. (Management) myths that are invented by one (organizational) society and culture can, therefore be carried by others, as different people are in contact, whether on a local or a global scale significantly through trade. Independent invention to extend from Wood (1992: 71) has resulted from (economic) factors underpinning (organizational and) societal evolution, a view shared by Campbell (1974: 72)[109] in that it has brought different people in contact. Such (economic) factors have provided the opportunity for an exchange in ritual. Therefore, communication *is* the common denominator in (management) myth across (organizational) societies and cultures.

Thus far it seems that the three explanations for the presence of (management) myth in human societies are complementary. This is because if (management) myth bears a set of logics to express order, if (management) myth is re-enacted in ritual and if (management) myth is communicated and exchanged (therefore in ritual and order), (management) myth itself is at the center of human societies. This is because it signifies the fundamental content of an identity through partition. (Management) myth presents such identities by means of its (management) descriptive system by mythifying an already mythified apprehension of the (organizational) world. In consequence I want to offer the following definition: "*Mythic identities*" refer to enacted self and other in their elemental and proprietary descriptive meanings. By extension (management) mythic identities refer to mythified (management) elemental and proprietary descriptive meanings.

(Management) myth not only attempts to unambiguously recruit self and other but also make available a ready-made logic in a way that nobody can find arguments against it. (Management) myth, in

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[109] As, for instance, the presence of Sumerian myths in the Bible, such as the flood and the great ark, or the mutual transformation of Islam and Hinduism according to Wood (1992: 21, 73).

short, naturalizes a center for meaning and identity construction. And in so doing, (management) myth gives subjects and objects a role to play. At this point I want to offer the following definition: "*Mythic vehicles*" refer to those who are given the role (by myth) to carry myth. By extension, (management) mythic vehicles refer to (organizational) members who carry myth. This function is essential to (management) myth as it gives them mobility thus an opportunity for dissemination and de-multiplication, a technology for their survival. They are moreover indispensable to their host. In becoming mythical, both subjects and objects as (management) mythic vehicles receive their (management) mythic identity, as a signifier signifying the (management) mythical content that has been in-scribed. It is an affirmation *through* and *in* (management) myth as the expression of a common denominator of human societies.

27 (Management) mythic structure under threat

If (management) myth is to express the common denominators of human concerns, psyche and (organizational) societies, it must have structure that is kept in balance. The two semiological (descriptive) systems must be kept in symmetry wherein the signified "concept" is related to two different signifiers, namely "meaning" and "form". There is no guarantee that this state is maintained. (Management) mythic structure to use Barthes (1993/1957: 122) is prone to 'deformations'. I therefore consider two types relative to the semiological (descriptive) system under threat.

To start with we have a deformation of the first-order semiological system, in that meaning empties itself to become only form. 'When it becomes form', Barthes (1993/1957: 117) explains, 'meaning leaves its contingency behind; it empties itself, it becomes impoverished, history evaporates, only the letter remains'. Thus, we witness a deviant regress from meaning to form where only a (management) descriptive system exists and no (management) myth.

This seems to be the approach taken by Tylor (in Segal, 2002: 23) especially when 'ideas' rest on a 'broad philosophy of nature, early and crude indeed, but thoughtful, consistent, and quite really and seriously meant'. That is, (management) myth (especially) in its scientific guise requires that emphasis be placed on the literal meaning rather than the figurative one: it is the condition for credibility. Thus

(management) myth is no longer credible to us because we have lost sight of its literal meanings. In Tylor's terms (in Segal, 2002: 24):

> Poetry has so far kept alive in our minds the old animative theory of nature, that it is no great effort to us to fancy the waterspout a huge giant or sea-monster, and to depict in what we call appropriate metaphor its march across the fields of ocean. But where such forms of speech are currents among less educated races, they are underlain by a distinct prosaic meaning of fact.

In this manner Tylor seems to consider that primitives have had the ability to understand the world in the same way as (management) scientists do (now): to provide prosaic, literal meanings of their surrounding. A similar remark is made by Malinowski (in Segal, 2002: 36) when stating that 'even the lowest savage communities have the beginnings of science, however rudimentary'.

With Tylor (in Segal, 2002: 24) (management) myth arises from curiosity to 'know the causes at work in each event [we] witness'. The underlying rationale in Tylor's thinking[110], Segal (2002: 21-22) explains, is that unlike personal causes, impersonal ones are likely to become mythic because they are material, predictable, generalisable, and efficient. There is interplay between imagination and reason or as Segal (2002: 29) has put it, 'imagination restrained by reason'.

The difference however between primitives and moderns lies not only in that the former (may have) provided a literal reading of (management) myths, but also, and more importantly, in that they experienced what was hypothesized in (management) myth, a point equally shared by Campbell. Primitives, for Tylor (in Segal, 2002: 28), could 'feel a live creature gnawing within their bodies in the pangs of hunger; they heard voices of the hill-dwarfs answering in the echo, and the chariot of the Heaven-god rattling in thunder over the solid firmament': it was existent.

This is why with Lévi-Straus (2000/1978: 40) it is suggested that to understand (management) myth we need to read it not as a

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[110] Underpinned by a 'comparativist' approach, Doty (2000: 126) notes.

series of events but as a 'bundle of events'[111]. Otherwise we might not 'feel at home in the world' (Segal, 1998: 19). The reason is attributed to the inability of modern (management) myth to signify the sacred, to connect the inner and the outer worlds: we are unable to have 'synchronic experiences' according to Jung (in Segal, 1998: 20), the experience of the world as meaningful - a sense of harmony.

Thus we have lost sight of the symbols present in (management) myth or even to fail to understand the symbolism because of the very limitations (management) myth has in terms of what it conveys to use Segal (1998: 10-11). It is not a question of the correctness of interpretation but the inability of a (management) myth to fully convey 'the meaning invested in it by the archetypes it conveys' *(ibid.)*. It is more than a question of the plurality of meanings; it is a limitation.

In the second case, we have the deformation of the second-order semiological system in that form empties itself to become only meaning. We witness a deviant regress from form to meaning where *only* (management) myth exists and no (management) descriptive system.

This is a problem that Jung (in Segal, 1998: 10-11) seems to be highlighting with reading and understanding the culturally transmitted elements, in that we may take the (management) mythical meaning literally[112]. This is why the presence of (management) myth in all (organizational) forms of expression disguises the danger that 'we get stuck in the myth' (Campbell, *The Message of the Myth*, 1988b). For Campbell (1986: 58), as is for Segal (1998: 42), the danger is that we only read the metaphor of (management) myth in terms of its denotation, as prose, as an allegory which is the meaning of the sign, and not of the symbol.

In this case we may lose from sight and mind that (management) myth unites 'being and becoming'[113] (Campbell, *Sacrifice and Bliss*, 1988d), unlike Schilbrack (2002: 86) who argues that myth does not use the language of being, non-being and becoming. We may further

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[111] Hence the parallel between understanding (management) myths and understanding music. For Lévi-Straus (2000/1978: 42-43) the processes are similar.

[112] It is therefore important to make the distinction between 'noumena' – unknown - and 'phenomena' – known - as per Kant (1998/1781 & 1787: 360).

[113] Symbolized by Shiva, as the Lord of the Dance (Campbell, *Masks of Eternity*, 1988f).

lose from sight and mind that (management) myth unites the dualities that characterize human condition. Especially, self and other, time and space in a 'vast dream, dreamed by a single being, in such a way that all dream characters dream too; so that everything interlocks and harmonizes with everything else' to use Shopenhauer (in Campbell, 1974: 490)[114].

With the above deformations in mind, there is therefore a proper reading of (management) myth. For Campbell (1986: 56) such a reading functions in a way so as 'to release the mind from its naïve fixation upon … false ideas, which are of material things as things-in-themselves.' It has an ethical function, also noted by Geertz (1993/1973: 93-94) when making the point that myth functions as a model *of* and *for* reality. To sum with Schilbrack (2002: 96) (management) myth justifies a way of life by 'describing the world really is', and in so doing justifies itself.

28   (Management) myth is not a fable

Given the arguments made in this study - short of its kind as I have sought to convey important ideas in a few words, it must be clear that (management) myth is neither a fable nor can be made to signify a fable; it does not deserve such a treatment. It is a logical (management) descriptive system with particular outcomes. And if this is the case, it is with Barthes (1993/1957: 109) a 'system of communication … a message', moreover, a 'mode of signification, a form'.

With Barthes *(ibid.)*,'everything can be a myth provided it is conveyed by a discourse'. This is because any object – and subject by the same token - of our environment can be decorated and acquire life through language and therefore signify more than the object itself. The process is not only linguistic but also selective. The consequences are twofold. On the one hand, (management) myth evolves as (management) language does (in action), while on the other, it is bound to be transformed, or even forgotten while new (management) myths arise, a process equally highlighted by Ricoeur (1969/1967: 163).

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[114] It is like 'cracking eggs to make an omelet', Campbell (*Sacrifice and Bliss*, 1988d) has aptly put it.

In this respect, (management) myth is always of actuality. This is because, to use Ricoeur (1969/1967: 18), (management) myth is involved with the construction of a 'neo-past', the construction of a contemporary form that expresses past values[115]. This is because the past, captured in (management) myth, moreover in (management) language, never stops changing its meaning: 'the present appropriation of the past modifies that which motivates us from the depths of the past' (Ricoeur, 1969/1967: 22). The construction of the neo-past is nothing else than the *re*-discovery of (management) myth where (management) experience is 'recapitulated', no longer as presence, but rather as movement (Ricoeur, 1969/1967: 163)[116]. This is also a point made by Henderson (1964: 108-109), who, drawing on Jung, explains that we continue to respond to psychic influences through symbolism that is contemporaneous, hence related to current social and historical events[117].

If (management) myth as neo-past is always of actuality, it means that (management) myth and its conditions of its existence are contemporaneous. Further, that (management) myth can be found to be structurally involved with any (management) descriptive system, be it, verbal, written, pictorial, cinematic, promotional as any of these modes is a support to speech, despite each mode calling upon a different type of consciousness. Such speech *is* mythical since with Barthes (1993/1957: 109, original emphasis) it 'is made of a material which has *already* been worked on so as to make it suitable for communication'. This is because all (management) descriptive systems presuppose a 'signifying consciousness' and (management) myth as a (management) descriptive system being involved with (management) descriptive systems and (management) mythic vehicles that sustain it makes use of such material to describe experience.

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[115] It is not the revival of the past as it is for Eliade (1963: 32-33), let alone a return to the sources and the construction of a 'fundamental' belief into the absolute infallibility of the Bible against liberal and modern practices to use Kepel (1994/1991: 105).

[116] Hence the difference between fundamental-past and neo-past. It is tantamount to making the difference between (management) myth-*ology* and (management) myth: the former obscures the difference between the experience captured by (management) myth and that lived by individuals whereas the latter does not.

[117] Hanson and Kay (2001: 30) also support this argument in that "Star Wars" 'is the rejuvenation of the major themes of the classic myth'.

In this manner, regardless of whether (management) myth uses personae and settings that are supernatural, the content of (management) myth, that which the (management) myth recounts and signifies, concerns directly the people using (management) myth in that it provides the grounding for their being and becoming.

This is certainly not the case of fables, that Eliade (1963: 22-23) considers to be 'false narratives' (compared to (management) myth as being a true narrative) because they are *not* true in themselves. In line with Eliade (1963: 11), Flood (2002: 175) and Gerhart and Russell (2002: 191) note that it is unfortunate that (management) myth nowadays is merely seen to be a 'fable', an 'invention', that is, pertaining to the imaginary and not the real.

It is therefore high time that such a co-notation was changed!

The reason lies in one fact. The fact is one, I suggest, because it is a visible fact of repetition (in the absence of an origin). To start with, there is ritual as a way of doing. If there is way of doing there must be a way of thinking. If there is a way of thinking there must be a way of describing. This is describing the a-temporal experience of being in and with the world, a concern for existence. If this line of thinking is correct, there can only be a single fact. There can only be presence of a common denominator underpinning experience, as it is *the* logical way to describe such an experience. This is (management) myth.

APPENDIX

The development of the investigative tool aims at confirming the claim that describe for a purpose, and that if this is the case, it is for a specific (realized) purpose, the sought after effects as the general outcomes that I seek to render specific. This involves the following steps:

First, asking respondents to confirm that whenever we describe the way we practise management to others, mainly staff, it is for a purpose.

Second, listing out a set number of purposes to be offered for assessment by operationalizing the classified management re-presented experiences, namely, rational (1) turbulent (2), cultural (3), emotional (4), power (5), and discursive (6). These are specified descriptive signatures signifying a management content, which is thereby given an identity that is constructed by the inscription of an order that denotes coherence, rendered specific by a set of statements – the purposes to be proposed.

At the same time the following aspects we dealt with:

- Ensuring that these statements are realized purposes in the sense that respondents do what they do as managers for an effect that is present.
- Ensuring to have an equal number of statements under each class[118], therefore 6 statements each, otherwise any computational operation is difficult in addition to introducing a bias in the survey towards some re-presentations at the expense of others.
- Attributing to each of the 36 statements a 5-point Likert scale to enable computations of means and standard deviations.
- Introducing the statements by a general statement (Whenever I describe the way I practice management to others, it is for the purpose to) to ensure respondents are aware that the survey seeks to link (management) description with purpose and not practice with purpose.

From having adopted a 'meta' position relative to management concerns, the following are the obtained purposes proposed for assessment:

Rational content

1. Maintain what I have planned to do.

2. Put some order in the work of others.

3. Say who does what in the organization.

4. Define organizational problems.

5. Establish the solutions to organizational problems.

6. Demonstrate that there is a reason for everything that happens.

Turbulent content

7. Match consumer and organizational needs.

8. Provide direction.

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[118] What to include and what to exclude, or even how to reduce statements is a decision without criterion.

9. Simplify complex issues.

10. Minimize internal pressures and problems.

11. Minimize external threats and pressures.

12. Encourage diversity of opinions.

Cultural content

13. Generate feelings of belonging to the organization.

14. Suggest solutions that take into account what others think and feel.

15. Raise the levels of motivation and maturity.

16. Strive to fulfil the potential and needs of others.

17. Help others understand who they are.

18. Encourage others to follow my example.

Emotional content

19. Promote organizational unity.

20. Generate a sense of organizational security and stability.

21. Create a sense of comfort that the organizational destiny is under control.

22. Promote shared set of ways of thinking and believing.

23. Normalize the thoughts and behavior of others.

24. Promote rituals and ways of doing to generate feelings of belonging.

Power content

25. Affirm my authority to others.

26. Influence the work of others.

27. Magnify the effect of my successes.

28. Minimize the impact of my failures.

29. Share opinions and beliefs with the few

30. Construct alliances with the few.

Discursive content

31. Rationalize and make sense of my successes.

32. Justify my failures.

33. Maintain what I believe should be done.

34. Persuade others to adopt my solutions.

35. Persuade others to adopt my beliefs.

36. Show others that I know how to run the organization.

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- Aristotle: Bekker system
- Wittgenstein: paragraph system

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